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PART II—SUMMARY OF COMPLETED PROJECT (FOR PUBLIC USE) 
To examine the interrelation of cognitive and social structures within biomedicine, 
the intellectual and political events which resulted in the formation of a problem 
domain were reconstructed. 	From the literature culminating in the 1970 discovery of 
the enzyme reverse transcriptase (RT) and its elaboration during the post-1971 Nation-
al Cancer Act years, key research and administrative personnel located at the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI) and various academic laboratories in the U.S. were identified 
and linked through coauthorship and citation networks. 	Sampling of these networks 
led to intensive interviews with fifteen scientists, including the former director 
of NCI and the two Nobel laureate co-discoverers of the enzyme, and to a demographic 
analysis of 99 RT researchers based on solicited vitae, biographical profiles, and 
measures of research productivity. 	TheSe data support the hypotheses that (1) the 
problem domain was formed by a confluence of ideas carried by scientists trained in 
an array of biomedical disciplines, (2) mission-oriented research programs such as 
those funded by the war on cancer inflate the role-of large laboratories (as depicted' 
in the literature) which exploit the basic-science discoveries made in smaller labs, ' 
(3) biomedical researchers are intellectually mobile, i.e., they tend to specialize 
in two or more'related areas simultaneously or concentrate their pUblication in one 
domain for short (2-5 year) durations, and (4) oral history, as•reconstructed through 
interviews, yields far richer and diverse perspectives on the research process than 
the written history found in public documents, e.g., the technical literature. 	In 
sum, the organization, transfer, and transformation of knowledge in biomedicine follow 
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SUMMARY 
To examine the interrelation of cognitive and social structures within 
biomedicine, the intellectual and political events which resulted in the forma-
tion of a problem domain were reconstructed. From the literature culminating 
in the 1970 discovery of the enzyme reverse transcriptase (RT) and its elaboration 
during the post-1971 National Cancer Act years, key research and administrative 
personnel located at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and various academic 
laboratories in the U.S. were identified and linked through coauthorship and 
citation networks. Sampling of these networks led to intensive interviews with 
fifteen scientists, including the former director of NCI and the two Nobel lau-
reate co-discoverers of the enzyme, and to a demographic analysis of 99 RT re-
searchers based on solicited vitae, biographical profiles, and measures of re-
search productivity. These data support the hypotheses that (1) the problem 
domain was formed by a confluence of ideas carried by scientists trained in an 
array of biomedical disciplines, (2) mission-oriented research programs such as 
those funded by the war on cancer inflate the role of large laboratories which 
exploit the basic-science discoveries made in smaller labs, (3) biomedical re-
searchers are intellectually mobile, i.e., they tend to specialize in two or 
more related areas simultaneously or concentrate their publication in one domain 
for short (2-5 year) durations, and (4) oral history, as reconstructed through 
interviews, yields far richer and diverse perspectives on the research process 
than the written history found in public documents, e.g., the technical literature. 
In all, the organization, transfer, and transformation of knowledge in biomedicine 
follow an "inner logic" that seems to resist both policy intervention and con-
ventional social science analysis. 
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The cooperation and assistance of several people have enhanced this pro-
ject substantively and operationally, but moreover, made it a most rewarding 
experience for me. My principal consultant, Dr. Kenneth Studer, was invaluable 
in the interviewing phase, while Ms. Iris Mitchell has been remarkable in trans-
cribing 25 hours of tape-recorded interviews into more than 600 double-spaced 
pages of text. The material comprising this report was conscientiously typed by 
Ms. Pamela Stembridge and Mrs. Gwen Nance. Never failing to provide sound ad-
vice and administrative information was Mr. James Camp. Document retrieval, 
xeroxing, data coding, and computer programming were ably performed by two 
Georgia Tech Industrial Management students, Mr. Stanley Muse, and later, 
Mr. Steven Shelley. The encouragement of local colleagues is always an asset; 
hence I am indebted to Mr. Jon Johnston and to Drs. Patrick Kelly, Morris Mitzner, 
Alan Porter, Frederick Rossini, and Jay Weinstein. Other confidants whose kind 
words have helped sustain me this past year were Dr. Ian Mitroff of the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh, and Dr. Stephen Turner of the University of South Florida. 
My wife Vicki, as usual, has been a loving sounding board. Finally, my thanks go 
to a patient and dedicated cadre of scientists who indulged this social scientist 
by interrupting their busy schedules, and then took an active interest in can-
didly sharing their insights so that I might realize my research goals. The 
commitment of each to recapture in 90 conversational minutes the history they 
shaped made for exciting and informative encounters that no student of science 
should forgo. Thank you Mr. Louis Carrese and Drs. Stuart Aaronson, John Bader, 
David Baltimore, Joseph Beard, Gary Gerard, Raymond Gilden, Maurice Green, Robert 
Huebner, Frank Rauscher, Jeffrey Schlom, Sol Spiegelman, Howard Temin, George 
Todaro, and Sue Yang. 
ii 
Two publications have already resulted from this project, both coauthored 
by Dr. Studer and myself: 
"The Politics of Cancer." Theory and Society 6 (July 1978): 55-74; 
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Cancer Problem Domain." Scientometrics 1 (January 1979): 171-193. 
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Growth and Specialization in Biomedical Research,  is nearing completion. A 
few publishers have expressed interest in reviewing it in its entirety. At 
least one other paper, probably utilizing excerpts from the interviews, will 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is the final technical report on Grant No. S0077-11593 awarded by the 
Science Policy Research Program in the Social Science Division of NSF. The 
grant provided one year of support, beginning in September 1977, although two 
years were requested in my proposal submitted by the University of Pennsylvania 
in January 1977, and resubmitted by the Georgia Institute of Technology in June 
1977. 
With this grant I (a) collected biographic and bibliographic data through 
on-site interviews, a mail solicitation of curricula vitae, and document re-
trieval, as well as (b) analyzed and consolidated these data with information 
compiled in earlier phases of the study (conducted under the sponsorship of an 
NIH contract when I was a Research Associate in Cornell University's Program in 
Social Analyses of Science Systems). My activities and findings derived from the 
NSF phase of support are detailed in the body of this report. A note on what was 
not accomplished in this one-year project, however, is appropriate here. 
Despite "mentorship" in the project title, this aspect of the study, con-
ceptualized genealogically in the proposal, had to be sacrificed. There simply 
was no time to link mentors and students within and beyond the reverse trans-
criptase domain in the systematic fashion I had envisioned. Some evidence of the 
linkage between lab directors and postdocs was unearthed and is duly reported below 
(see "Demography"). But the time constraint precluded the extensive interviewing 
of more geographically dispersed scientists to discuss the mentor-student relation 
and to mine interviewees' local documentary sources for formal clues. Thus this 
study, and the wealth of information I suspect it would yield, remains undone. 
That the interviewing was so successful, but restricted to key researchers 
and administrators, represents a regrettably unfulfilled aspect of the project as 
proposed. Securing the hypothesized range of opinion sought from scientists 
"weakly tied" to the domain, i.e., structurally peripheral or only transiently 
linked to its major coauthorship or citation networks (see "The Interviews"), was 
not feasible in the approved time frame and budget. Consequently, no travel 
occurred west of the Mississippi River, specifically, to several west coast centers 
and researchers, e.g., University of California Medical School in San Francisco, 
and the Bishop-Varmus team. Of course, the same lament could apply to our ex-
clusive U.S. focus; foreign travel to centers in the U.K., Israel, and West Germany 
was impossible. Though this domestic focus was justified, the potential of 
sampling perspectives from the international cancer community nonetheless had to 
be deferred. What makes this lost or "deferred" opportunity so personally frus-
trating is that a project that is international in scope could provide additional 
evidence of confluences in biomedical domains. 
Indeed, the notion of intellectual problems cross-cutting disciplines and 
even ongoing research programs with a mission or targeted orientation has been 
supported. But empirically, the mechanisms of convergence or confluence lack 
specificity, even though "intellectual mobility," migration between problem do-
mains, or inter-disciplinarity appears to be theoretically viable. It may be 
applicable to the physical sciences as well, as recent studies (Edge and Mulkay, 
1976; Friedkin, 1978) attest. Much more and varied data are needed to move from 
metaphor to model, as it were, for as one referee of the project proposal observed, 
"Confluence of rivers is straightforward; confluence of [intellectual] influence 
is problematic at best." 
If such criticism is taken to mind, then it joins other problems identified 
for further study which antedated and have outlived this project, or have been 
generated by it. Of the former variety the problem of defining, identifying, and/or 
circumscribing specialties, clusters, networks, or domains for study persists. 
Some degree of arbitrariness is inevitable (Woolgar, 1976a), but the lack of 
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comparability in what we call and how we measure our units of analysis confounds 
the task significantly. Because conceptual (im)precision underlies operation-
alization and measurement procedures, the prescription of Blume (1977) and 
Spiegel-ROsing (1977) for theoretical rapprochement and multiple methodological 
approaches must be heeded. If we are to bridge various science studies, the 
tradeoffs in utilizing concepts, measures, and data sources that are near and 
dear, i.e., familiar and manipulable, must be explicitly addressed. 
Related to this problem is the one of generalizability. How far can we rea-
sonably generalise the findings of a case study? What is "reasonable," especially 
in the present case, when the study is at a sub-specialty or problem domain level? 
My reply is that these may be the wrong questions to ask, particularly with bio-
medicine as the referent "cognitive region" (Attie, 1975; also see Report of the  
President's Biomedical Research Panel, 1976). For reverse transcriptase research 
(i.e., a domain) may be representative of cancer virology or cell transformation 
(specialties), unrepresentative of virology (a discipline) and cancer research 
in general (a supra-discipline or broad multidisciplinary field), but typical 
of how the war on cancer affected research and collaboration within the labora-
tory (i.e., local teams) or within the government sector ("in-house" at NCI). 
In short, the comparability of, as well as the basis for generalizing from, 
biomedical case studies reside in the rationality or "inner logic" of this cog-
nitive region of science. 
Consider this further: in all its singularity, a problem domain reflects the 
intellectual, organizational, and political properties of the contexts in which 
it is embedded. True, the reflections may be distorted, but this is why trian-
gulated measurement is indispensable in science studies. Indeed, in micro-level 
case studies the need for triangulation may seem imperative. I would argue, how-
ever, that macro-level analyses, too, require such "validation." For example, 
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Narin's (Narin et al., 1976) bibliometric typology of research activity purports 
to distinguish "basic" from "clinical" publication as well as the flows between 
such categories--its utilization in other discipline- and problem-bound literatures. 
But the typology seems to assume uniform (unchanging over time) content of journals, 
and utilization is measured by aggregate citation counts. Thus this macro per-
spective on journal relationships within the biomedical literature is built upon 
a defensible but assailable "influence map" methodology. Though providing diag-
nostics for policy purposes and heuristics for research, this methodology is in-
sufficient for explaining such things as the formation of biomedical domains, cita-
tion patterns within RT, and other relationships at the non-institutional level. 
The point is that generalizing the findings from a macro methodology to the 
micro level is simply not warranted. This is why the problem of scope must be 
resolved by the rapprochement of multiple and complementary approaches to biomed-
ical science. Yet in so doing, the nature of the research task is transformed. 
Indeed, the empirical "discrepancies" yielded by various approaches to the same region 
of science shift the task from one of supplying answers to that of reporting the 
range of perspectives different methodologies tend to evoke. So perceived, both 
the analyst and the policy-maker must weigh and extract meaning from assorted evi-
dence rather than legitimate and interpret as definitive the findings derived from 
any one approach. The task is thus conceived as one of approximating and nego-
tiating reality (see Lemaine et al., 1976; Edge, 1977). 
When the interdependence of intellectual and social realities is examined in 
the context of application, e.g., disease prevention and control or the discovery 
of causal agents, the policy or "external" social dimension looms large (see 
Williams et al., 1976). And so it was in the reverse transcriptase domain; a study of 
growth of a research community was transformed into a broader inquiry of funding 
priorities and mechanisms as they impinge on the organization, conduct, and 
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politicization of research (see "The Politics of Cancer"). 
Suffice it to say that the ensuing knowledge claims are only partially repre-
sented in and by the technical literature of a domain; this public record is a 
social form that is rhetorical and self-serving (Gilbert, 1977; Knorr, 1977). Oral 
history, as created in interviews, is no less rationalizing, vulnerable to poor 
memory and recollections that juxtapose or blur detail (though I am far more 
sanguine about this than Woolgar, 1976b). The key to reconciling these accounts 
is not to discard or dismiss any of them as myopic or utterly lacking in objectivity. 
Each lends a perspective on scientific reality that describes products, structures, 
and the "state" of the reality, e.g., science indicators (see Elkana et al., 1977), 
or the processes whereby knowledge claims are produced and negotiated. It is 
noteworthy that the traditional policy emphasis has been on products; perhaps 
the micro analyses found in the burgeoning "specialty" literature will enhance 
our understanding both of how science gets done and what its payoffs are. 
In the present case, interviewing of protagonist-informants rendered insights 
into process--recapturing the meanings they attributed then and now as the state of 
knowledge and their respective research programs advanced--that were otherwise in-
accessible. It was precisely my belief in the "force of knowledge," its incom-
plete if not misleading measurement, that led me into conversation with participant 
reverse transcriptase researchers; away from those conversations I came with new 
grounds for interpreting research processes in a domain of Big Biology. 
The newest of these "new grounds" are presented in the three chapters that 
constitute this final report. These chapters, however, were selected from a 
longer manuscript (still in preparation) on the four-year study of Viruses  
and Cancer (a Table of Contents follows). The first chapter included here 
outlines the interview strategy, the second demonstrates the use of the inter-
view data in an expanded version of "The Politics of Cancer" article published 
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in July 1978, and the third features a demographic analysis synthesizing the 
career data collected this past year to augment the intellectual history of the 
RT domain. References to chapters not contained in this report occasionally 
appear. Early revisions of these chapters have circulated as working and pre-
sented papers since 1975. But revised versions of these other chapters will be 
available as part of the book manuscript by the end of this calendar year. 
Thereafter I will be glad to furnish copies upon request. 
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VIRUSES AND CANCER: A CASE STUDY OF GROWTH 
AND SPECIALIZATION IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
Table of Contents 
Forward 
Prologue 
Part I. THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF BIOMEDICAL SPECIALIZATION 
Chapter 1. Biological Problem Domains: Cell Transformation to 
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A history of cell transformation through its three 
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and the domains of research they form. 
Chapter 2. Phaedrus' Knife: Defining Specialties Within Viral 
Cell Transformation 
Operationally defining problem domains and character-
izing their growth through the research literature. 
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and organization of the cancer research mission in 
the National Cancer Institute. 
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Chapter 5. Social Organization and Coauthorship among Reverse 
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Communication Relations 
The structure of citation and cocitation highlighting 
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discovery of reverse transcriptase. 
7 
Epilogue. PROBLEM DOMAINS, CONFLUENCE THEORY, AND THE PLACE OF KNOWLEDGE 
IN SCIENTIFIC GROWTH 
The separation of the intellectual and the social 
aspects of science; relativism and realism in the 
sociology of science; a confluence theory of science 
and its significance for science policy. 
Appendices 
Appendix A. The Interviews 
The methodology of structural interviewing, reflec-
tions on the interview sessions, and protagonists' 
retrospective accounts as a data source in the 
sociology of science. 
Appendix B. Algorithms and Rationale for Structural Analysis 
Isolating structural properties of bibliographic 
data via multidimensional scaling and eigenstructure 
analysis. 
Appendix C. A Demographic Profile of Reverse Transcriptase Researchers 
A career patterns analysis of the interview subjects, 






THE METHODOLOGY OF STRUCTURAL INTERVIEWING 
Interviewing is anything but a novel data-collection tool in sociology. 
The selection procedure which precedes such data collection, however, not 
only targets subjects for interview, but does so for various reasons and 
according to any of a multitude of designs (see Hyman, 1975). Sampling of 
networks is quite unlike conventional designs which seek to optimize repre-
sentativeness, and therefore generalizability, through a random selection 
procedure. 1 Our reasons for interviewing were neither generalizability (in 
the statistical sense of making inferences about a population) nor representa-
tiveness (in the sense of covering a known distribution of opinion or know-
ledge). Rather, our concern was to identify and then interview individuals 
who occupied particular positions in different networks. Herein lies the 
novelty of our data collection effort. 
Because any social network is a structural representation of relation-
ships generated by particular behavior, e.g., authorship, one can derive 
any number of networks generated by different behaviors which relate the 
same set of individuals in numerous ways. To compound the sampling problem, 
any behavior and relation formed by it can be disaggregated over time. Such 
disaggregation lends a dynamic dimension to the static structural represen-
tation. Disaggregation also multiplies the number of network structures, 
each of which can be thought of as a sampling frame. The choice then 
becomes whether to sample each frame, say, by year and generating relation, 
or somehow to juxtapose the frames to reveal patterns of variance and 
invariance in positions across networks. Structurally, the individual whose 
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position in a network changes by year and relation may be as "interesting" 
or valuable for interviewing purposes (if not more so) as one who is 
"strongly tied" in every network. This is the crux of Granovetter's (1973) 
perceptive argument that sociometrically there is strength in "weak ties." 
Another consideration is that the tempo by which structural relations 
change, i.e., evolve over time, may not be accurately captured by a network 
representation that arbitrarily slices relations into calendar year units. 
In other words, for the sake of analytical convenience, we may be sacrific-
ing precision in the measurement of structural relations. How, then, does 
one "preserve" the social process underlying the structural representation 
by sampling (i.e., "operationalizing") the network? 
For sure, one must sample purposively, not randomly, and in the absence 
of sociometric data, rely on visual inspection of the structures themselves: 
What are the configurations? Which dyads and triads appear repeatedly? Is 
their position (or physical location) on the network "map" relatively 
stable. Do they disappear in some years and on some relations and then re-
appear? These questions disclose the nature of the task. After studying the 
pictures 2 of structured relations (e.g., see Figure Al) and noting some of 
the patterns implied in the above queries, we began to perceive certain 
individuals and laboratories as important targets for further examination. 
Combined with our knowledge of intellectual events and principal characters 
in the narrative history of RT, the structural data offered another per-
spective (or set of perspectives) on visible researchers and organizational 
sectors, namely, those emerging from various bibliographic generators of 
networks, e.g., co-authorship, co-citation, and co-acknowledgment. 
Structural sampling must utilize this abundance of information: 
It must draw on the array of available empirical information to determine 
10 
FIGURE Al 
R.T. CO-AUTHORSHIP NETWORK, 1973 
1  3 
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who should be selected for interviewing. 3 Targets may be selected, therefore 
for their consistency of position in different networks, their centrality 
in some, their peripherality in others, their organizational setting, and 
their links to others in the relevant research populations. The rationale 
for sampling according to multiple criteria is that structural positions and 
relations are assumed to condition one's perceptions of the phenomena in 
question. What structural sampling seeks to tap is the divergence of per-
spective that participation in a social system, e.g., a formal communication 
network, entails. Interviewing the designated targets of a structural 
sample will presumably develop insights about not only one's participation 
in the network, but also one's perspective on whether the network really 
exists, how it has evolved, and why. 
Structural interviewing operationalizes the notion of "triangulation" 
(Webb et al., 1966). The ability to approach one's subject in a myriad of 
ways should indeed seem to be the key to faithful social reconstruction of 
reality--in this case a problem domain or research area within biomedicine 
That social scientists would rather invest in single indicator approaches 
than sort and merge multiple indicators and perspectives prompted our 
recourse to an interview strategy derived from structural data. Intrinsic 
to any kind of social data, structural or otherwise, is sufficient measure-
ment error to render findings and interpretations based upon them dubious 
at best. Rather than belabor or bemoan this point, it would seem far 
preferable for social scientists to assume its truth and adopt a skeptical, 
but constructive, measurement posture: Treat data as a tentative baseline, 
as an approximation to refine and on which to build with the collection 
and analysis of other data. 
Structural interviewing does this in two ways: It builds on structure 
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(i.e., generated networks), and it recognizes the credibility of one's 
perspective on the structure, his/her role in creating it, sustaining it, 
etc., without attributing credence to views based on structural position. 
Credence stems from the collection of views, the assimilation of per-
spectives from different vantage points in the network(s). In short, 
structural interviewing is a "convergence technique" (Carrese and Baker, 
1967). It accords primacy to no datum, while it respects all. It does 
subordinate social measurement to the chronology of historical fact, but it 
neither disqualifies nor disarms the social scientist from fashioning ex-
planations and interpretations. Indeed, structural interviewing allows the 
"outsider" to glimpse through "insider's" eyes without becoming either blinded by 
insider's vision, or resolutely myopic as outsiders (particularly social 
scientists studying natural scientists) tend to be. 
As defensible as the rationale for structural interviewing might 
be, the methodology itself still lacks the elegance to be called, and 
readily applied as, an algorithm. Perhaps a comparison with an imperfect, 
yet tractable, methodology-cum-algorithm in science studies, analysis of 
co-citation clusters, will illustrate the promise of structural interviewing. 
Co-citation analysis establishes linkages between pairs of documents 
listed in the bibliographies of articles in some citing literature. The 
resulting set of cited documents represents a "map of science" never before 
visible in the research literature (see Small, 1973; Small and Griffith, 
1974 ; Griffith et al., 1974). These retrieved documents cluster in various 
subject areas of science, and thus reveal the structure which connects sub-
jects as well as those documents which dominate in a certain area. 
Elsewhere (Chubin, 1976: 4510, I have questioned the assumptions of 
co-citation analysis. Germane to the present discussion, however, is 
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recognition that the co-citation cluster is (1) a purposive sample of litera-
ture which (2) lacks an inherent decision rule for determining significantly 
visible documents. That is, "visibility" is an arbitrary threshold of cita-
tions relative to the total number any pair of documents might garner during 
some designated period. As a diagnostic tool, co-citation analysis, according 
to its proponents, can identify "hot" areas of research. The sole attempt to 
confirm this hypothesis (Small, 1977) has been encouraging. Nevertheless, if 
co-citation analysis is used to guide selection of potentially important areas 
for research, citation and the "implicit theory" (Mulkay, 1974) that underlies 
it become decisive; subject matter becomes secondary. Intellectual issues and 
organizational settings are treated as relatively invariant in time and mani-
festation despite citation "eccentricities" to the contrary* (Price, 1970; 
Meadows and O'Connor, 1971; Sullivan et al., 1977). 
Co-citation analysis, tome, anyway, seems fraught with unknowns; its assump-
tions strike me as plausible but unsound. Indeed, as a diagnostic it inverts the 
order of analysis by methodologizing the content of science, shackling its intel-
lectual manifestations to a single indicator--the citation or bibliographic re- 
ference. And as a higher-order datum, the co-citation--a purposeful listing 
of documents in combination--is a proxy for communication, information, allegiance, 
deference, etc. But why begin with a proxy when its antecedents are accessible 
and knowable? 
Structural interviewing reorders the approach to scientific "objects." 
It begins with a known subject matter and is a proxy for nothing except the 
clearly unfeasible alternative of interviewing a population. It derives from 
multiple networks or clusters of co-relations. And, above all, it is a 
methodology blinded a priori neither to intellectual idiosyncrasy nor by 
*As an eleventh-hour addendum, I can report further experimentation with co-
citation thresholds (in the area of "opiate receptors") by Small and Griffith 
at the Third Annual Meeting of the Society for Social Studies of Science at 
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana (3-5 November 1978). 
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convenience. Structural interviewing is a culmination of other component 
structural analyses. As a small sample technique, it requires the findings 
of such analyses, e.g., of co-citations, to inform both the actual sampling, 
and the interviewing itself. 
Our sampled RT targets and their respective organizational sites are 
summarized in Table Al. Again, the interviews were intended to elicit 
recollections and subjective perceptions to compare with other observations--
not only those of other interviewees, but with bibliographic network data and 
historical documents as well. 
Thus, we claim that as a retrospective technique, structural interviewing 
endows the process and product of reconstructing a research area with evolu-
tionary and integrating perspectives. We also concede that perspectives do 
not an algorithm make; they surely do make for a potent tool in scientific 
specialty studies, however. What follows is a test of our claim: a descrip- 
tion of how the (1) targets were contacted, (2) the interview sessions were con-
ducted, and (3) the methodology of structural interviewing can be used to re-
construct through a composite of protagonists' accounts an oral history of a 
problem domain. 
INITIAL CONTACT 
Each interview target (or "subject") was sent a personalized letter in 
January or February of 1978. This letter described the purpose of the re-
search, its support by an NSF grant, and carried an admission that, after 
collecting and analyzing substantial bibliographic and biographic data, we 
as "outsiders" lack the insights that only researchers working in a problem 
area can provide. Two or three sentences describing our perception of the 
subject's contribution to RT research followed plus an invitation to share 
his/her perspective with us in a 1-2 hour "conversation" ("interview" being) 
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Interview Targets  
Primary 	 Secondary  
Gallo, Robert C. 
Smith, R. Graham 
Parks, Wade P. 
Aaronson, Stuart A. 
Scolnick, Edward M. 
Todaro, George J. 
Huebner, Robert J. 
Ross, Jeffrey 
Reitz, Marvin S. 




Ting, Robert C.Y. 
Wu, Alan M. 
Yang, Stringner S. 
Axel, Richard 
Baxt, W. 
Gulati, Subhash C. 
Hehlmann, R. 
Gerard, Gary F. 
Grandgenett, Duane P 
Table Al 
Initial Structural Sample of Local Organizational Sites 
for Targeted Interviewing of RT Researchers 
Local Organizational Site  
Government: 
Laboratory of Tumor Cell Biology, NCI 
Viral Carcinogenesis Branch, NCI 
Viral Leukemia and Lymphoma Branch, NCI 
Primate/Quasi-goverment: 
Bionetics Research Lab (Litton) 
Flow Lab 
Medical School: 
Institute of Cancer Research, 
College of Physicians and Surgeons, 
Columbia University 
Institute for Molecular Virology, 
St. Louis University School of 
Medicine 
Academic Departments: 
Department of Biology, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology 




Huang, Alice S. 
Verma, Inder M. Temple, Gary F. 
Temin, Howard M. 
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a dreadfully formal term). A stern paragraph urging cooperation with our 
efforts, as well as our flexibility in accommodating to the subject's busy 
schedule, concluded the letter. A self-addressed stamped postcard accompanied 
the letter asking the subject to indicate specific dates within the month 
(the bulk of the interviews occurred in February and March) which were most 
convenient. The subject was instructed that soon after receiving this card 
we would be in contact by phone to confirm a date and time for our meeting. 4 
Table A2 contains the names of the interview targets with whom we spoke 
and their institutional/organizational sector which helped to frame their 
selection. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that our targets, regard-
less of sector, were most receptive to our invitation to talk. This receptiv-
ity, as the excerpts from the interviews attest, was reflected in their candor, 
sincerity, and genuine interest in our work. We discuss this happy circum-
stance below as a prescription for future studies. For now, suffice it to 
indicate that subject to travel budget and time constraints, we were able 
to speak with most everyone we had hoped--though, in retrospect, had no grounds 
for thathope--to see. Indeed, the responsiveness of all, especially NCI 
personnel, far exceeded our expectations. 
Merely from reading Science reports and hearing colleagues express 
pessimism about the willingness of NCI researchers to discuss the cancer war, 
we approached this sector with concern, if not trepidation. For this reason, 
we decided to contact NCI people before we ventured into academic labs, par-
ticularly the ones where the discovery of the enzyme had been made. For-
tunately, our concern was unfounded. So long as we were "neither from the 
Washington Post nor named Dan Greenberg," as one of our subjects put it, the 
meeting was a welcome opportunity; for some it was a veritable catharsis, an 
unburdening of many of the pressures which highly visible, and therefore, 
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Table A2 
RT Interview Subjects, by Organizational Sites 





Bader, John "4 
. b Carrese, Louis 
Huebner, Robert 
Rauscher, Franke 
 Todaro, George 
Beard, Joseph e 
 Gilden, Raymondf




 Spiegelman, Sol 
Academic Department 	 Baltimore, David 
Temin, Howard 
a
Head, Cell Growth Regulation Section, Chemistry Branch, NCI; interviewed on 
recommendation of early subjects. 
b
Associate Director for Program Planning and Analysis, Office of the Director, NCI, 
interviewed on recommendation. 
c
Former director, NCI; currently, Executive Vice-President, American Cancer Society; 
interviewed on recommendation. 
d
Sole supplier (on NCI contract) of Avian Myeloblastosis Virus and purified reverse 
transcriptase; interviewed as most acknowledged in RT literature; Emeritus Professor 
of Surgery at Duke University; currently President, Life Sciences Research Labs, 
St. Petersburg, FL. 
e
Currently at Frederick Cancer Center, Frederick, MD (managed by Litton-Bionetics). 
(Currently at Laboratory of Cell Biology, NCI. 
gCurrently Head, Breast Cancer Section, Laboratory of Viral Oncogenesis, NCI. 
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controversial, in-house projects represent (a theme elaborated below). 
Two NCI luminaries whom we were unable to see were Robert Gallo and 
John Maloney. The latter was contacted less than two months after he had 
been rather unceremoniously removed as head of the Special Virus Cancer Pro-
gram, the NCI program which, upon review in 1973 by the Under Committee, 
came to be perceived as embodying all the vices of big contract research and 
few of the virtues. The meaning of Maloney's "promotion" to Assistant Director 
of the Institute at the request of Arthur Upton was clear to our subjects. 
They advised we "leave Maloney alone," while Maloney's secretary suggested 
we talk to his "acting" successor, John Sibal. For various reasons, we 
declined this option. 
The failure to see Gallo was of a different sort. His travel schedule 
simply did not permit our meeting. A chance to interview a long-time 
associate of his was discouraged by one or two of our NCI subjects who said 
our persistence to see Gallo would be rewarded ("Gallo is a dynamic guy"; 
he is also a staunch advocate of contract research and channeling "unlimited" 
sums to cancer research). 
Partly due to our disappointment over missing these targets (though 
only Gallo was originally targeted), and partly based on our realization that 
NCI program heads and lab researchers regard NCI administrators, planners, and 
policy-implementers with a mixture of perplexity and suspicion, we decided that 
the subjects of such ambivalence deserve close attention. Our choices, though 
not necessarily representative, were outstanding: Frank Rauscher, former NCI 
Director, and Louis Carrese, Associate Director for Program Planning and Analysis. 
Carrese was particularly receptive to our questions and spoke in animated 
fashion for 21/2 hours about the incredulity harbored by NCI researchers 
about his office. There was a vindicating, yet compassionate, tone to this 
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interview. In fact, Carrese said that he would encourage an assessment of 
the planning and policy which has emanated from his office for the last 15 
years; it would reduce much misunderstanding about his "systems" approach as 
well as his mediating role vis-a-vis Congress and NCI researchers. 
Rauscher, now an Executive Vice President of the American Cancer Society, 
and unanimously respected by the NCI researchers we interviewed, is the epitome 
of public relations. However, he was anything but evasive; he is circumspect 
and demanded that we discuss the ultimate purposes of our study before he 
allowed us to switch on the cassette recorder. Once satisfied, he produced 
a fluid 90 minutes of information and pledged to assist us in securing some 
important documents which had eluded us for months. Like many of our subjects, 
he volunteered to read select portions of the manuscript and asked to be kept 
informed of the study's progress. 
Without exception, in our in-person contacts we sustained the good im-
pression which our letter of inquiry about the interview had apparently esta-
blished. Within three weeks of each interview, we sent a note of thanks to each 
subject for his/her cooperation and of assurance that we would keep them apprised 
of, and indeed enlist their skills to evaluate, our findings. Like good anthro-
pologists, we returned "from the bush" with the good will of our tribe of sub-
jects intact, a situation we strived to guarantee by our behavior prior to, 
following, and during the interviews. How this was done in the "during" pro-
tion of the interviews is the next topic for review. 
THE INTERVIEW SESSIONS 
The interviews took place in the office or lab of the subject. With one ex-
ception, the subject was engaged in a three-way conversation with both the PI and 
his principal consultant. Each session was audio-taped with the permission of the 
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subject who was informed that he or she would be sent for review a copy of 
material containing quoted excerpts from the interview. In this way, both 
the accuracy and the context of quoted statements would be preserved. 
None of the subjects balked at our recording procedure, though several 
used the apparatus to differentiate "on the record" from "off the record" 
commentary. On occasion, we were asked to "switch off" in preparation for 
an especially candid, and sometimes ugly, remark. Naturally, we complied with 
such requests. Sometimes we were surprised when sensitive remarks warranted such 
requests, but no request was made. 
In all cases, one of us (D.E.C.) spent 5-7 minutes recounting the origin 
of the study, its guiding questions, and progress to date. This initial ex-
planation, of course, was less a communication of information than an ice-
breaking, tone-setting device. As we became more adept at tailoring our 
introductory remarks to the role of the subject's work in the RT saga, we 
succeeded in establishing rapport earlier in the conversation. The one ele-
ment contributing to the rapport, however, was intellectual--our conversance 
with the science of the subject's research. Our ability to discuss experi-
mental and theoretical issues, e.g., the provirus hypothesis and the unre-
liability of inhibitor data, made us credible, curious social scientists who 
had taken our subject matter and its creators very seriously. This ability 
to enter the biologist's world of discourse requires ample preparation--
essentially an understanding of primary source materials, and awareness of 
historically significant events (not just discoveries, but conferences and 
less official public exchanges), and a knowledge of researchers' whereabouts, 
collaborators, and programs at various times. Without this reservoir of 
pertinent facts, one simply cannot ask pertinent questions. 
This is one critical difference between social networks and structural 
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interviewing. Networks can help identify interview targets; they are of 
little help in determining what those targeted people should be asked. 
Structural interviewing results from a cumulation of information about tar- 
gets and those topics they are singularly equipped to comment upon. The oppor-
tunity to interview should not be squandered on sociometric or structural 
questions (which in the abstract are not of gripping concern to the subject 
or his science). Such an approach nestles the interviewer comfortably in his 
own world of sociological discourse and obviates the need to probe for intel-
lectual bases of the behavior represented in a social network. 
Structural interviewing surmounts, or at least erodes, the intellectual 
barrier between the natural scientist and his social scientist-interrogator. 
Our subjects sensed our effort to surmount this barrier. In response, many 
became an "open book"; indeed, some seemed grateful for the questions of out-
siders who could understand enough, but not so much as to be a threat. In 
short, we were taken into the confidence of almost all of those with whom we 
spoke. 
After opening with queries about whether the subject was surprised by the 
discovery of RT, what his or her research focus was at the time, and whether 
this focus changed soon after the discovery, we eased into discussion of the 
subject's organizational setting (e.g., the structure of his lab, division 
of labor within it). The conversation then gravitated to the question of 
antagonism between NCI and academic labs. This was our typical point of 
departure into the policy area (e.g., effects of the war on cancer on one's 
research and lab structure, and reaction to the Zinder Committee report crit-
icizing in general the contract mechanism in NCI, and particularly the Special 
Virus Cancer Program). This is not to say that the interviews were so 
structured that topics were not addressed in other sequences. They were. 
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One of us would have a one-page schedule of topics to be covered, and in no 
case was a topic untouched for lack of time. Questions raised by observations 
made by the subject were followed up either as they occurred or after the 
schedule was exhausted. 
As anticipated, we found the interviews to be quite intense. The ad-
vantage of our both being present at the interview was clear inasmuch as one 
of us would pursue a line of questioning, allowing the other to formulate and 
phrase questions privately; the other would then enter the dialogue anew. The 
mental concentration required to process answers and prepare related questions 
was exhausting indeed. In most cases, both we and the subject were drained after 
90 minutes. 5 
Near the end of the interviews, the subjects were asked to suggest the 
names of colleagues whose insights they valued and who, they thought, would be 
willing to speak to us. It was overlap in these "snowballed" names that led us 
to NCI administrators, but confirmed that our selection of literature-based 
interview targets was well-founded. 6 
A final note: There is a "learning effect" which takes place when suc-
cessive interviews are conducted during a period of only a few weeks. This 
effect surely polishes the syntax, phrasing, and delivery of questions, but 
it also heightens the interviewers' anticipation of replies to those questions. 
When one gains facility with one's research instrument, there is a need to 
compensate for inflections and facial expressions which may inadvertently cue 
the subject that "I'm curious as hell about your response, but I think I 
know what you're going to say," or "I've asked this delicate question of all 
the previous subjects; now how forthright are you going to be?". The way 
we compensated for such stirrings was to preface the question with a naive 
remark such as, "Because we are not formally trained as biologists . . ," or 
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"We realize now that the Cancer Institute is so vulnerable; it is constantly 
in the public eye, yet it seems to have unduly attracted much bad press . . ," 
or, stronger yet, "We were frankly critical of the NCI and hence deliberately 
chose to interview NCI personnel before visiting the academic researchers. . • • 
Whether our "staged naivete" was convincing is unknown, but we suspect that the 
subject, upon hearing such an admission, was more inclined to share a confi-
dence that he ordinarily would not. This is pivotal in the interviewing of 
scientists: You must give a little to get a little. You must strike a balance 
between credible and informed interviewer on the one hand, and confidant and 
respectful seeker of valuable new information, on the other. Above all, you 
must doggedly pursue the subject who, in the same interview, can adopt the 
posture of public relations man, intellectual, healer, bureaucrat, visionary, 
friend, and adversary. As interviewers, we became sensitive to such changes 
in character; we tried to adapt accordingly. Tellingly, refusal to answer a 
question was rare; smoke-screen was more frequent, but with two interviewers 
and 90 minutes or more of conversation, questions can be reworded, digressions 
can be stymied, rapport can build. In very few instances did we feel our 
control over the situation slipping. Even those few subjects who sought to 
set the boundaries for the discussion at the outset of the interview became 
less defensive, their answers more fluent. They carried the discussion; we 
merely clued them into the problems and issues we wished to discuss. 
The implications of these interviews for future studies appear to us 
to be far-reaching. In the following section, we compare our experiences with 
recent and prominent attempts to use scientists as a primary data source in 
the sociology of science. 
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PROTAGONISTS' RETROSPECTIVE ACCOUNTS AS A 
DATA SOURCE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
Although the interview--focused, open-ended, or whatever--is a standard 
sociological mode of data collection, there are few precedents in the sociol-
ogy of science literature for interviewing scientists as we did. Foremost 
among the precedents are Edge and Mulkay's (1976) analysis of the development 
of radio astronomy in Britain, and Zuckerman's (1977) study of American Nobel 
laureates. Each of these researchers has reflected on their methodology, 
particularly on the interaction between interviewer and scientist-interviewee 
(Mulkay, 1974; Zuckerman, 1972; 1977: Appendix A). Because our interview 
approach is intermediary between these efforts--combining the best of both 
while resembling Olby's (1974) impressive synthesis of interview material and 
other informal personal communications with historical documentation--we deem 
it instructive for future studies to add our experience to this corpus and 
reflect on interview methodologies. 
Underlying our concern for reflection is not merely the reactivity of 
the interview as a data source. Of course, the interview is a social act and 
sociologists are wont to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. But inter-
viewing scientists, whether or not they qualify as "ultra elites" (to use 
Zuckerman's designation of the laureates), presupposes a theory of data. Our 
theory coincides putatively with that articulated by Mulkay (1974:110): 
Firstly, if the sociological study of science involves a close examina-
tion of its technical culture, the active cooperation of technically 
competent participants must be gained in one way or another. Secondly, 
on many issues of sociological interest, members of a given research 
community are likely to have firm and agreed definitions of reality 
which are linked to their technical and scientific assumptions. It 
is often possible to regard such issues as problematic only if the 
investigator has enough technical knowledge to challenge these firm 
definitions. 
It is at this point that our approach departs from that of Edge and Mulkay. 
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For they advocate mounting the "challenge" by combining and counter-
balancing the perspectives of an insider (in their case, David Edge, trained 
as a radio astronomer, and, therefore, an ex-participant scientist), and an 
outsider (Mulkay the sociologist). "Perhaps the best arrangement is to have 
the scientists interviewed by both a sociologist and a participant/ex-partici-
pant" (Mulkay, 1974:114). 7 
But perhaps what is "best" in this domain of science would not be so in 
another. We found that two outsiders, as indicated earlier, can learn the 
technical culture, not only to their own satisfaction, but to the subjects' 
satisfaction. This is confirmed by Zuckerman (1977) who, with embarrassed 
immodesty, reports some of her subjects' appraisals of her preparation for 
the interviews: 
You've done your homework, haven't you? (p. 262) 
You've read the history pretty thoroughly, haven't you? (p. 263) 
Such rhetorical affirmations belie the resistance which social scientists 
often encounter when they interview scientists. Consider this exchange be-
tween Zuckerman and a biochemist: 
L[aureate]: With the arrogance of the scientist, I should say that I don't 
think it is possible to make a good study of collaboration among 
scientists . . . unless one has had some work in natural science. 
Int[viewer]: Well, as you know, we all labor under certain disadvantages. My 
own sense is that you have to familiarize yourself as much as 
possible with the kind of work you're studying. 
L: 
	
You can't do that very well at a distance. . • • 
(Zuckerman, 1977:266). 
What is so telling about this exchange is that most sociologists of science 
subscribe to the biochemist's view. Indeed, the eight chapters which precede 
Zuckerman's "Interviewing" appendix speak louder than her words cited above. 
The science which led to the Prize or the occupation of the "forty-first chair," 
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though competently described, is clearly a secondary concern to more mundane, 
but sociologically exemplary, topics, e.g., collaboration patterns, secrecy, 
and differential productivity. Doubtless, Zuckerman got her laureates to 
speak, but subordinated their words to the tune of "social structure and 
organization" in science. A recent rendition of this tune goes: 
[Scientific institutions and processes] have a logic and a structure 
of their own that interact with but are not determined by the cognitive  
contents of science and the organizations of research (Ben-David, 1977: 
265, italics added).8 
In Zuckerman's defense (and Ben-David's, for that matter), "selective 
reception" is an affliction which plagues us all; the fault lies in the 
remedies we may or may not seek. The strongest remedy is multiple indica-
tors about which neither enough can be said nor too often. Multiple indica-
tors may quiet the symptoms of selective reception, but the affliction lives 
on (see Gilbert, 1978:16). 
For how, in the words of Mulkay (1974:110), "do we use these various 
kinds of partially conflicting information to reach a valid inference?" If 
we view validity as a range and not a fixed point, as we must, then commit-
ment to multiple indicators will include the collection of protagonists' 
retrospective accounts of what they did--heard, spoke, and saw--"back then." 
This is an extra check which, at least, corrects the "misleading impressions 
of steady, undeviating advance toward the state of knowledge which now 
exists" (Mulkay, 1974:111). Further, it re-creates, within the bounds of 
recollection and self-justification, the chronology of actions and reactions 
which are rarely registered in even the most introspective scientific writing. 9 
 Interviewing helps, in short, to demythologize--to distinguish historical 
accuracy from scientific accuracy, "great men" from great acts. 
Perhaps the best example of the interview as a demythologizing tool 
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involves the triad of co-discoverers, the Nobel laureates Temin and Baltimore 
plus the unsung NCI microbiologist John Bader who refused to stake a claim 
in 1969 based on his inhibitor data--data which prompted Green to postulate 
the existence of an RNA-directed DNA-polymerase (Green and Gerard, 1974:190). 
To rely solely on written accounts of the events culminating in the discovery, 
one would credit Temin with bold hypothesizing in 1964 and dogged determina-
tion in conducting six more years of experiments before demonstrating the 
plausibility of the hypothesis. Baltimore, while a newcomer to the research 
site, would share the credit for executing the crucial experiment, too. Bader 
today remains an obscure footnote in the history of the discovery. That his 
work paralleled Temin's is suggested once in the latter's Nobel address 
(Temin, 1976). 
From our interviews, however, it would seem more than justified that the 
uncited, unfeted Bader share some of the recognition allotted Temin and Balti-
more. Baltimore confesses that he "jumped the fence" for two days to do the 
experiment. The virus used was obtained by a phone call to his old friend 
and NCI project monitor George Todaro. Ironically, around this same time, 
Bader's request for virus from the Viral Oncology Program was declined 
because he wasn't a contractor doing research in that area. In Bader's (1978) 
words: 
I wasn't working in Viral Oncology at the time. I was working in 
Chemical Carcinogenesis. I applied twice for batches of virus to 
the National Cancer Institute, to Viral Oncology, and they said 
that it had all been committed to the Program, and I wasn't part 
of the Program. 
Bader, ever the textbook scientist guided strictly by the data and 
shunning speculation, confessed "no regrets" for his behavior: 
I've always had the feeling that ideas were a dime a dozen. And 
for anybody to go around making conjectures and hypotheses, it 
may be interesting, but, really, that's blowing in the wind. 
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Our impression is that he might have been more assertive, but the "unim-
aginative" label hung on him by a few of our subjects seemed little more 
than ignorance of the man and his work. 
Bader also pointed out that the first paper on the requirement for 
DNA synthesis in reproduction of RNA tumor viruses is his 1964 paper, 
published 5-6 months prior to Temin's statement of the provirus hypothesis. 
Written history attributes to Bader a 1965 paper (appearing in the same 
journal as the 1964 one, Virology) that builds on Temin's hypothesis. As 
for the criticism that data produced by inhibitor research is of question-
able validity, Bader suggests, without rancor, that this is not a problem 
for a careful experimenter, but that Temin's experiments were sloppy. This 
may have accounted, in part, as other of our subjects conjectured, for 
Temin's departure from Cal Tech and the hubris attributed to him by his 
postdoctoral supervisor there, Harry Rubin.
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Thus, the Temin-Baltimore triumph is a far more intriguing story when 
told orally then pieced together from documents. It is more than a story of 
one man being anticipated (Bader), another moving patiently and inexorably 
toward the discovery (Temin), and a third independently duplicating the 
discovery, almost on a lark (Baltimore). The discovery of reverse transcriptase 
took at least 6 years and 3 diverse personalities to unfold. The retelling 
took--and yielded--much more. 
Structural interviewing thus adds a dimension to the fathoming of fact 
from perception--this exercise of reconstruction--by socially constructing 
reality in the most basic sense. Since targets are selected primarily on 
structural grounds, it is their supposed divergence of perspective that is 
brought to bear on inference-making. The convergence of these perspectives 
is the measure of validity alluded to (as a range) above. Validity is not 
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absolute; it is rather an approximation, a socially-induced consensus wrought 
of intersubjectivity (Mulkay, 1978). 
Reconciling inconsistencies in evidence by appealing to more and dif-
ference kinds may seem a nuisance, a needless muddying of the waters. Our 
reply to this contention echoes that of Mulkay (1974:118): 
. . . methodological theories either implicit or explicit . . ., underlie 
the use of every kind of evidence. 
Inherent in every kind of evidence, in other words, is error which must be 
"controlled." Multiple indicators afford some control by freeing one from 
particular distortions or biases of data. Multiple indicators render theories 
of data explicit by acknowledging imperfections in measurement and impelling 
the investigator to seek additional data. Though structural interviewing is 
far from definitive, we believe it is part of an affirmative empirical ap-
proach to reconstructing the precise interplay between the cognitive and the 
social in science. 
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NOTES 
1This has been the focus of a recent paper by Granovetter (1976) who, like 
us, is groping for a network sampling algorithm; his purpose and approach, 
however, differ radically from our own (also see Burt, 1977). 
2The "pictures" were produced in our project by a multidimensional scaling 
routine which translated frequencies (or strengths) of pair-wise relation-
ships into distances depicted in two dimensions (for details, see Chapter 6 
and Appendix B). 
3Structural sampling is somewhat akin to "dimensional sampling" (Arnold, 1970), 
a framework for drawing a small purposive sample representative of a population 
on n specified dimensions. The dimensions framing a structural sample are 
network positions and organizational ties, i.e., lab sites where authors per-
form, collaborate, compete, and cite. 
41n two cases, it should be noted, the initial contact was made by phone in 
which the subject's secretary, and later, the subject himself, were informed 
of our intentions and arranged the meeting. 
51n only one case did the subject continuously evade our policy queries by 
deflecting them into rambling technical expositions. Upon terminating this 
interview, we vowed, out of our dissatisfaction, to elicit more direct answers, and 
develop in subsequent interviews other subjects' perceptions of this remark- 
able man who was known to so many. His professional personality, as we later 
learned, tends toward long-winded, perceptive, and optimistic statements about 
cancer prevention programs. This subject had not duped us after all, but he 
knew far more than he shared with us. 
6Stfll, researchers in foreign countries and on the west coast of the U. S. 
(particularly the Bishop group located at the University of California Medical 
School in San Francisco) had to be omitted from consideration due to the 
limitations noted earlier. Curricula vitae were requested from these 26 
scientists, as they were from the subjects we did interview. Appendix C 
presents a demographic analysis of our interview subjects and mail respondents. 
7Mulkay (1974:114) is quick to qualify this statement, admitting that, "As 
the research proceeded this division of labour became less distinct, so that 
I [Mulkay] contributed to the analysis of intellectual development and, more 
noteably, my partner contributed to the analysis of social processes." 
8This independence of logic and structure from the "cognitive contents of 
science," of course, is what we have argued against throughout our study. 
The methodological point is that to assume such independence precludes the 
collection of a whole class of data, namely, that which relates to ideas 
and could be viewed as variables upon which social structure in science 
depends. 
9Woolgar (1976b) has found, for example, that "discovery accounts," as 
developed in a series of interviews over 2-3 year periods, tend to be 
unreliable, i.e., subjects juxtapose, delete, and generally scramble 
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events. "The facts" assume a status that is less stable and authoritative 
than the historical record shows. 
°Recall Rubin's skepticism about the discovery of reverse transcriptase, 
even after the enzyme activity was observed in a wide array of viruses 
(Spiegelman et al., 1970). The existence of the DNA provirus was finally 
confirmed to the virologist's satisfaction by Hill and Hillova's (1972) 
demonstration of infectious DNA for Rous sarcoma virus (Temin, 1976:1077-78). 
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. THE POLITICS OF CANCER 
NORMATIVE STRUCTURES AND FUNDING THE MISSION 
...cancer is not simply an island waiting in isolation for 
a crash program to wipe it out. It is in no way comparable 
to a moonshot--to a Gemini or an Apollo program--which re-
quires mainly the mobilization of money, men and facilities 
to put together in one imposing package the scientific 
knowledge we already possess. 
Instead, the problem of cancer--or rather the problem of the 
various cancers--represents a complex, multi-faceted challenge 
at least as perplexing as the problem of the various in-
fectious diseases.... We have barely begun to perceive the 
fantastic array of causative factors involved in cancer, the 
methods by which they work, and the agencies by which they 
may be controlled. We are not yet ready to start a count-
down for an anti-cancer blast-off, no matter what emotional 
appeal such an approach may have to the public. 
Philip R. Lee (in U.S. Senate, 1971a: 
140-141) 
Chancellor, 
University of California 
Internal NCI affairs are very complex, and outsiders comment 
on them at their peril because there are so many political 
issues involved. 




Policy is "essentially an ordering of priorities" (Greenberg, 1967:200). 
Policy research purports to contribute to the ordering. Science policy re-
searchers who so choose can cast aside their naivete and plunge, as Temin suggests, 
into the world of biomedicine. The choices, however, do not end there. For 
the sociologist of science who simply seeks to understand the effects of bio-
medical research policy in the United States on the development of research 
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(perhaps hoping in the future to offer advice on the ordering or reordering of 
priorities), a second choice concerning "distance" must be made. How close does 
the sociologist dare to get to the politics or a dread disease? What kinds of 
information does one deem to be germane to an assessment of current and past 
priorities, outcomes, and mechanisms of control? How, in short, could the so-
ciology of biology contribute to policy decisions? 
Such choices must necessarily be made prior to the assessment or empirical 
study itself. The choices of sociologists of science, however, have been vir-
tually unanimous: keep your distance and adopt a framework that is socially 
impeccable--attentive to organizational structures, institutionalization, and 
the ethos of science--but impervious to intellectual content. Another choice, 
one that sociologists have spurned or avoided altogether, namely, the use of 
the structure of argumentation of a field to scrutinize the efficacy of its 
policies and their relation to the social setting of new research priorities, 
seems to be more realistic and helpful for the scientist and policy maker. 
But how do policy decisions for funding, for instance, affect this scienti-
fic argumentation process? Biological scientists, e.g., James Shannon (see 
epigraph, Chapter 1) seem to perceive the confluence structure of their problems 
and criticize funding policy from this perspective. What science would have been 
like had certain policies not been implemented, one will never know; but the 
sociologist can attempt to understand the political forces that shape the scien-
tific problems that are studied. By understanding the political context the 
sociologist will be better able to understand the possible policy biases that 
are inherent in certain sociological techniques. 
In later chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), for example, the problem of how 
self-citations within laboratories, laboratory size, and the density of networks 
interact will be discussed. If the size of laboratories is determined to a 
great extent by funding policy, then funding policy directly affects the perceived 
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social structure, measured by co-citations, as well. If, in turn, the density 
of a network were taken as an indicator of the "hotness" of a subject area, 
one might be greatly misled. What is perhaps even more to the point, if policy 
in turn were based on such perceptions (namely, more money invested in the large 
laboratories that represent dense clustering patterns in terms of co-citations), 
one would be involved in the self-confirmation of an inherent methodological bias. 
The study of science policy is, of course, a subject in itself. The more 
limited goal here is to observe the critical discussion surrounding the early 
stages of the war on cancer. Specifically, we seek to raise sociological con-
sciousness about the rhetoric and organization of science as they impinge on 
biomedical research policy, funding, and the disposition of knowledge. 
THE CONTEXT OF ASSESSMENT 
U.S. medical research policy, as was evident by the late 1940's "was not 
going to be established by hard consensus on a grand design. It would be frag-
mentary and incremental; in short, evolutionary" (Strickland, 1972:50). The 
evolution of the cancer research policy, 1 however, was interrupted by the passage 
of the National Cancer Act in 1971.
2 
With the influx of monies into cancer-related 
research (Kalberer, 1975 and Figure 3.1) the evolutionary course of basic cell 
transformation research was to be profoundly altered. 3 The prospect of a National 
Cancer Authority, envisioned in Senate Bill S.34 as separate from NIH and possibly 
administratively independent of the National Cancer Institute, had generated 
scientific, organizational, and political cross-currents that were seldom found 
in earlier, small-scale biological research. As some (notably, Weinberg, 1965) 
had predicted, the time had come for Big Biology: in the past Big Physics met 
with success, so now the national funding focus must shift to the biological 
sciences. 
35 
The major contemporary impetus for expanding cancer research was heralded 
by former President Nixon's second State of the Union Message: 
I will also ask for an appropriation of an extra $100 million 
to launch an intensive campaign to find a cure for cancer, and 
I will ask later for whatever additional funds can effectively 
be used. The time has come in America when the same kind of 
concentrated effort that split the atom and took man to the 
moon should be turned toward conquering this dread disease. 
Let us make a total national commitment to achieve this goal 
(U.S. Senate, 1971a:74). 
This request elicited an overwhelmingly positive response. Cancer as a symbolic 
threat was seemingly capable of unifying both Congress and the electorate (as 
Vietnam had not). In turn, it was difficult for scientists to find fault with 
this increased subsidy of biological science, given the broader context of slacken-
ing governmental support of science (Strickland, 1972:236-290). As Richard Rettig, 
in his thoroughly insightful Cancer Crusade: The Story of the National Cancer  
Act of 1971, states: 
In political terms, the Act is of interest because it indicates 
how a small but powerful elite composed of private citizens 
mobilized sufficient political resources to secure passage of 
legislation opposed by the National Institutes of Health and 
by most of the biomedical scientific community. In policy 
terms, the Act captures much of the current conflict between 
the public and its elected representatives eager to see life-
saving and life-prolonging results flow from biomedical re-
search and, on the other hand, a scientific community acutely 
conscious of the long time and great uncertainty characteristic 
of the process by which medical research is translated into 
clinically useful results (Rettig, 1977:xiii). 
Predictably, some reservations about the funding of cancer research were 
expressed. Dr. Campbell Moses, medical director of the American Heart Association, 
noted before the Senate subcommittee on health, 
...that if the state of research in cancer makes reasonable such 
a comprehensible effort to the control of cancer today, an 
exactly parallel effort is even more appropriate in the field 
of heart disease. In the cardiovascular field, we know that 
the expansion of our research effort, and the comprehensive 
full-scale application of the fruits of already available 
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FIGURE 3.1 
The National Institutes of Health 
AMOUNT (IN LOGARITIMS) OF APPROPRIATIONS 
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research and technology, would save lives now (U.S. Senate, 
1971a:231). 
There resides in these remarks an attitude that the cardiovascular field (which 
studies the number one killer, heart disease) is ripe for research, riper in fact 
than cancer. Political symbolism and scientific investment priorities seemed, 
at least to some, confused. But while such reservations are implied, there was 
also an unmistakable endorsement of the principle of funding the cancer program. 
As Senator Edward Kennedy remarked at the close of this testimony, "There are 
those who say if you can't get a raise yourself, the best thing that can happen 
is for the fellow next to you to get a raise" (U.S. Senate, 1971a:232).
4 
So while most scientists were reluctant to criticize an allocation to the 
"fellow next to them"--there was tacit agreement that Big Biology was needed and 
cancer was a strategic site--reservations centered on research organization. How 
was Big Biology to be organized? It is customary in sociology when such views 
are expressed about organizational structures to think in terms of vested 
interest, power maintenance, or political gain; what emerged was researchers' con-
cern about how the Cancer Act was to be administered and how this related to the 
development of biomedical science. Whether it be administered autonomously as 
a NASA-type special project or as part of the existing NIH organization was more 
an issue of research styles and reasoning processes within biomedicine than one 
of maintenance of role relations and political allegiances. If one takes at 
face value, at least provisionally, the scientists' expressed concerns, the issue 
at hand in the Cancer Act is how biomedicine should interface with existing organi-
zation.
5 
Aside from the inevitable charges of favoritism and the abuse of power 
(both discussed below), the scientists' rhetoric centered on impediments to the 
advancement of knowledge inherent in the "mission mentality." What is at issue 
was the cognitive orientation toward research mobilization which the biomedical 
scientists shared, and which must be characterized if one is to understand their 
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critical posture toward organizational imperatives,
6 
e.g., new funding mechanisms. 
The biomedical researcher in the 1960's had already witnessed the pressures 
toward bigness and the scientific difficulties with mission-oriented research. 
As HEW Secretary John Gardner (1966:1602) cautioned in 1966: 
The question remains whether...we should mount large-scale, highly 
organized applied research or [other] developmental projects 
with specified short term goals. The answer [to both] is 'yes'. 
But in giving that answer we must bear in mind that each such 
effort is apt to be extremely expensive.... And we must not 
imagine that dollars and large-scale organization are an 
adequate substitute for ideas and a sound scientific base. 
Where the ideas and the scientific base do not exist, it is 
possible to waste vast amounts of money under the banner 
of practicality. 
This caveat was echoed with even greater intensity by former (1955-1968) NIH 
Director Shannon in whose view, according to Strickland (1972:189), 
Targeted research, research aimed at finding cures for 
particular health problems, was...not only the most ex-
pensive but certainly the most wasteful kind. The waste 
was not limited to dollars, but included use of scientific 
energies, for research efforts narrowly aimed at single 
targets could restrict the beneficial effects of the inter-
nal dynamics of science. Moreoever, for NIH to place too 
much emphasis on directed research would be to retard the 
development of science in another way: it could artifi-
cially skew the production of new medical scientists. 
Throughout these discussions it was the "scientific base," the "internal dynamics 
of science" that was being used as the rationale for organizational structure. 
Indeed, science was not to be equated with its organizational structure. 
In the early 1970's, again many scientists recognized that the conquest of 
cancer was not a NASA-type operation because the problem to solve was essentially 
a nontechnical one. By early 1971 it was clear that the National Cancer 
Institute was destined to be reorganized in accordance with a new mission-
oriented mandate. When Congress established the Special Virus Leukemia Program 
(1965) with an appropriation of $10 million, it became obvious what Congress had 
in mind. They wanted results! And to get results this Program engaged in more 
contract research than had been the custom of any NIH agency (see Kalberer, 
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1975:475f). Such contract research demanded, in turn, a new type of planning, 
and the operations research strategies that had worked for other areas of science 
were once again called upon for assistance. Director Carl G. Baker, Frank Rauscher, 
the newly appointed Chairman of the Special Virus Leukemia Program, and Louis M. 
Carrese, a systems management specialist set out to develop a rational basis for 
mission-oriented (therefore, contract-oriented) cancer research (Baker et al., 
1966; Carrese and Baker, 1967; see Culliton, 1973). Although they clearly 
recognized the limits of organizational theory when it was applied to biomedi- 
cal research programs, and although they desired to remain as flexible as possible, 
they were nevertheless constrained to make certain assumptions limiting the scope 
of the program: "The main assumption or working hypothesis on which the over-all 
program is based is that at least one virus is an indispensable element for the 
indication (directly or indirectly) of at least one kind of human leukemia 
(including lymphoma) and that the virus persists in the diseased individual" 
(Baker et al., 1966). The emphasis on the viral etiology of cancer, in parti-
cular the importance of RNA viruses, had been organizationally blessed.
7 
Scienti-
fic "rewards" were now to be defined in terms of various lines of research which 
would begin with this assumption and progress toward the cancer cure. Contracts, 
it would seem, were often stigmatized by the academics both because they repre-
sented this new organizational mandate, and because they removed research from the 
independently motivated researcher. But in the 1970's when medical researchers began 
expressing their concerns about the National Cancer Act, the organizational die 
had long been cast. 
To most scientists, however, the intellectual underpinnings of cancer re-
search were radically different from the usual input-output model of purely tech-
nological programs. If the technological model works, it works because the "black 
box" interposed between the inputs and the outputs is well known or imminently 
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knowable through some directed effort. In the case of cancer research, the 
contours of the black box are sufficiently vague that it is difficult to decide 
where not to invest. 
How then, are research investments made (in the guise of policy strategies)? 
Surely there is disdain, expressed in the testimony before the health subcommittee 
of John A. D. Cooper, president of the Association of American Medical Colleges,
8 
for the nonscientists' view of how scientific answers materialize: 
An unfortunate misconception apparently is developing that the 
mere injection of additional federal cancer research funds will 
produce somehow an instant cure for cancer. Its equally mis-
leading corollary is that the key to the conquest of cancer--
one of the grimmest and most intractable groups of diseases 
that besets the world's scientists--lies in the managerial 
efficiency and the capacity of the medical-industrial complex 
(U.S. Senate, 1971a:391). 
Other excerpts from his address reiterate the point: 
The Manhattan Project and the space program have been cited 
as successful precedents for the establishment of indepen-
dent mission oriented agencies. However, ...harnessing the 
atom and the space program were largely technological 
challenges built upon a firm base of fundamental scientific 
knowledge. Their targets, though far away, were defined. 
In the Cancer Conquest Program the targets are diffuse, 
unseen and largely unknown (U.S. Senate, 1971a:102). 
There is no instant cure [for cancer]. And to imply that 
money can buy one is as unconscionable as it is to suggest 
that the key problem is managerial rather than scientific... 
But one fact is clear: The mere size of the national 
investment in cancer research is not the substantial deter-
minant of speed in the conquest of cancer... (U.S. Senate, 
1971a:392). 
The stark contrast of the views of Benno Schmidt, who chaired the National Panel 
of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer, forerunner of the existing President's 
Cancer Panel, 9 with those expressed above exemplifies that the organizational 
debate cuts deep: 
The valid analogy is not the scientific analogy but the organi-
zational analogy. The cancer program, in order to succeed, needs 
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the same independence in management, planning, budget presenta-
tion and assessment of program that those programs [splitting 
the atom or the space program] needed... (U.S. Senate, 1971a:196). 
Rauscher (1978), recalling the passion of the debate, moderates Schmidt's tone: 
I think so long as the Plan is reflective of the state of the 
art and doesn't try to force the state of the art, and that 
was the big fear of course, that the bull's eye was going to 
be used to tell 'John' what he was going to do, and what he 
couldn't do, for that matter. It never was intended that way. 
I was a scientist, still am, and I would have rebelled myself 
at that. Carrese understands this very well, but many people 
don't understand that he understands it. And they still look 
upon planners now as a necessary, but almost undesirable, part 
of the picture. 
It might just be that Big Biology demands organizational structures which, 
because of the "state of the art" and the nature of the discovery process(es), 
diverge from ordinary organizational principles in large-scale research. That 
is, sociologists may have too hastily dismissed the power, the needs, of scientific 
idea structures as formative agents of organizations. But does this not capture 
the sentiment of the biomedical community, i.e., give us Big Biology but not 
mission-oriented research. The problem seems to lie in the structuring of pro-
blems and intended solutions so that they escape the usual parameters of problem 
domain formation (see Chapters 1 and 2). The Nobel laureate and NCI critic, 
James Watson, asserts 
...that high-quality cancer research is likely to be much more 
difficult to pull off than most other forms of biology.... 
[Id]e may not have even one really hot clinical lead that has 
a good chance to lead somewhere soon with a major cancer. So 
we must be much more careful than we have in the past as to what 
we allow our lobbyist friends to claim for us.... We should do 
the science we are trained for and not hold the carrot too close.... 
But if we respond to the fear of less cancer money for next 
year by flashing out even shakier new leads, say, in tumor 
immunology, to mask the fact that we still have not made the 
big breakthrough, we have nowhere to go but down (quoted in 
Hixson, 1976:178-179). 
On the one hand, such statements reflect the tremendous pressures on the 
biomedical community to effect a cure for cancer. This can be seen in the type 
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of question that the present Senate health subcommittee (still chaired by Edward 
Kennedy) continues to pose to the President's Biomedical Research Panel: "Why 
don't you people in the NIH and the medical schools spend less time 'understanding' 
disease and more time preventing or curing it?" (Culliton, 1976:33). On the 
other hand, Watson's statement reflects the peculiar nature of biomedical progress, 
namely, it is difficult to predict where a "breakthrough" will occur.
10 
Finally, 
it reflects the "uneasy partnership" (Lyons, 1969) between government and science. 
The "fear of less cancer money for next year" elicits a public relations response 
from the scientist; this response must be that progress is being made.
11 
The separation of imposed social structures from the structure of biomedical 
progress seems to be the source of the scientists' concern. If this is the nexus 
of the policy problem for the biologist, then it would seem to be the most cru-
cial site for sociologists to analyze. To assess the rationality of the bio-
medical research effort, the sociologist must question scientists' complicity 
with the organizational-managerial orientation to research criticized by Cooper. 
For cancer, of course, is much more than an area of scientific research; it is 
a highly visible symbol and thus peculiarly vulnerable to political abuse. The 
growth in the number of cancer victims, the shift in the age structure of the 
voting population and its possible partisan manipulation, growing concern over 
whether science could structure itself, and the need for conspicuous investments 
in science in the face of its dwindling public image (see Morison, 1969; Shils, 
1972a; Toulmin, 1972) and proportion of the GNP, all capture something of the 
political tensions pervading cancer research. Cancer as a unifying symbol pro-
vides a basis for political mobilization that perhaps can be exceeded only by 
issues of national defense. Again a statement by Cooper is apropos: 
In an ideal world, the Association would say there is no 
need for new legislation to carry out a new scientific 
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offensive against cancer. But the situation being what it is, 
there clearly is going to be some legislation (U.S. Senate, 
1971a:393). 
That "situation" was charged with political overtones, forces with which scientists 
were ill at ease. To compound the situation, House Bill H.R. 10681 was introduced. 
The role of the author of this bill, Representative Paul G. Rogers (D-Florida), 
in effecting the compromise that the National Cancer Act of 1971 represented has 
been underplayed. Rogers paraded before his subcommittee member after member of 
the biomedical community who 
went on record in opposition to an autonomous cancer agency,... 
[supplying]...a refutation of the Senate [Kennedy] bill and 
justification for this [Rogers'] own.... The net effect was to 
suggest that the Panel of Consultants [led to Schmidt] supported 
only by the American Cancer Society land Richard Nixon, as it 
were], was isolated from the mainstream of biomedical thinking 
(Rettig, 1977:233). 
It was also a Rogers-called witness who drew attention to the discovery 
of reverse transcriptase by Temin and by Baltimore, noting (1) that this ad- 
vance offered promise of determining whether viruses cause cancer in humans, and 
(2) that David Baltimore's work had been supported mainly by the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. To Rogers, and undoubtedly his subcommittee, 
this basic scientist, who had unexpectedly contributed to cancer research from 




Although Congress was ultimately convinced of the necessity for continuing 
the new cancer program within the structure of NIH in the form of a compromise of 
S.34-cum-S.1828 and its House counterpart H.R. 10681, the internal politics of 
cancer remained tense. On 23 December 1971 as an invited guest described, the 
President 
came to sign the Cancer Act of 1971. Cancer research had 
entered the political arena. The Congressmen and Senators 
who guided the law into being smiled broadly as the cameras 
focuses on them. Most of the scientists in the audience 
did not smile; many were worried. The hoopla surrounding 
the Cancer Act implied the conquest on cancer in the near 
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future because a couple of hundred million dollars a year more 
were to be channeled into cancer research. Those of us there 
who knew the 'state of the art' had cause to worry (quoted in 
Rettig, 1977:277). 
Thus, political, organizational, and scientific components of cancer research 
signify all too well the alienation of the research process from the broader 
social milieu which supports it. Neither science nor society can afford to 
ignore the difficulties of mission-oriented Big Biology. When a Sloan-Kettering 
virologist, in the wake of the Summerlin "mouse-painting" affair, can say, "I 
have some advice for young researchers in biology. Stay out of cancer research 
because it's full of money and just about out of science" (quoted in Hixson, 
1976:161), it is cause for concern. Whither the cancer mission? 
THE MISSION AND CANCER RESEARCH ORGANIZATION 
The demands of science, organization, and politics were and remain intimately 
intertwined in the campaign to conquer cancer. And the effectiveness of any 
evaluation of a program such as this demands that the various ingredients receive 
their due portion of credit and blame. As one might expect after more than 
seven years of the program, a lot of credit and blame is available. Daniel 
Greenberg has leveled severe criticism at the optimistic claims of finding a 
cancer cure that emanate from the National Cancer Institute, presumably seeing 
such claims as politically motivated and statistically suspect. The conserva-
tism of the structure is also singled out for attack: 
My next visit was to the National Cancer Institute, where the 
official line is given on the record, but contrary views are 
offered only privately. 'It just doesn't serve to rock the 
boat,' a scientist told me. 'Look, when you've got 10,000 
radiologists and millions of dollars' worth of equipment, you 
give radiation treatments, even if study after study shows 
that a lot of it does more harm than good. What else are they 
going to do? They're doing what they've been trained to do. 
Like surgeons. They're trained to cut, so they cut.' And 
research on prevention? 'It's picking up a bit after all 
these scare stories,' he said. 'But the level is actually 
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a joke' (Greenberg, 1975:4). 
Has this conservatism of training, which for Greenberg includes a conservatism 
of treatment as well as beliefs regarding the etiology of cancer, stymied re-
search progress? Even if it has not, Greenberg's alleged subordination 
of scientific knowledge to organizational structures suggested that the research 
tactics of NCI are often ill-founded and doomed. 
Not surprisingly, there is a body of opinion, if not evidence (see below), 
to counter this charge. Many cognoscenti point proudly to the Virus Cancer (nee 
Special Virus Leukemia) Program. From our interviewees we learned: 
You can't mount a national effort when Dick Rauscher and John 
Maloney are sitting in their labs dispensing their own virus 
just to certain scientists. Great big technical problem. Can 
you produce viruses, virus preparations, of high potency, high 
infectivity, high purity, in vat quantities so that lots of 
people can work on them? Sure. That [Virus Cancer] Program 
did that. 
I think the NCI did a couple of things, and had to do some 
things, unlike the other Institutes. First of all, we had 
a number of line items in our budget which were, in effect, 
a mandate from the Congress to do so much at such a level in 
a particular field, not in a project now, but in groups of 
projects. Cancer control is a good example. Not only is 
there a separate appropriation for that part of the Program, 
but an authorization as well coming out of the Kennedy- 
Rogers committees. So part of what we did was in effect built 
in or locked in because of the mandates. We strove, and I 
think successfully, to maintain the emphasis and integrity 
of our basic laboratory structure within the Institute, but 
we did one thing different; and I still believe strongly 
that this is the way to go. We relied--we made a conscious 
decision to rely on--our good bench people in-house to 
help us manage outside programming. Management, scientific-
wise, Carrese-wise, in my judgment was as important as doing 
good science. 
There was one key feature of the [Program] for which Rauscher 
and Maloney must take a lot of the credit. They foresaw, when 
the thing was going to expand, that there would be logistical 
problems in supply and demand. They knew there would be a 
requirement for viruses on a large scale, cell culture on a 
large scale, for animals, etc. So from the very beginning, 
they created a resource logistic mechanism which would solve 
that problem so that by the time that guys like me came into 
the field, and I said, 'Now, look,' I told them, for example, 
that I would isolate and purify reverse transcriptase for 
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them within one year if they would give me enough virus, and 
I told them how much virus I needed. In fact, Joe Beard got 
his start because of my demand, and he started as a subcon- 
tractor under my contract. And when I went to Joe and I said, 
'Joe, look, I need this and I'll give you the enzyme,' and I 
said, 'I need ten grams of virus about every two months,' he 
said, 'No problem,' and he delivered it. And we gave him 
the enzyme. We published the first purification in RT. 
That's the kind of theing that if the mechanism for under-
writing Joe does not exist, if I couldn't go to the logistic 
department saying, 'Look, I need another 100 thousand bucks 
to do this job,' and them say, 'Okay, here it is,' that would 
have taken ten years to do, or maybe even twenty, if you have 
to use piddling amounts of virus. And the reason I was able 
within two weeks after confirming the thing with Rauscher 
[virus], we confirmed it with nine different viruses. The 
reason is that I had those viruses available to me. 
The Virus Cancer Program, because of its existence, and the 
level of funding that it had, or that it has, has provided 
a level of support for one relatively small area of science, 
that's far out of proportion to its total scientific impact. 
Now, its medical impact, you can argue about. I consider 
that the Virus Cancer Program was a good guess, because 
if you were going to try to hit the problem of cancer 
hard with an integrated program that you probably could 
not have made a better choice than to focus on viruses. 
Because the outcome, if you were right, if the guess was 
right, the outcome would be impressive. Yes, it was not 
as right as maybe we might have thought it was, and so the 
results have been not as dramatic. They've been scientifically 
very productive. 
Such guarded praise of the Virus Cancer Program only hints at the evils it came 
to symbolize. It was perhaps the most visible contract program amidst the glaring 
visibility of the cancer mission, as operationalized by NCI. It was, therefore, 
the most vulnerable to criticism by the scientific community as well. And criticism--
some say a surfeit of criticism--it surely got. 
The Virus Cancer Program and Organizational Criticism: The Zinder Committee Report  
In 1974, the report of the ad hoc Zinder Committee, so named for its chair-
man, Dr. Norton Zinder of Rockefeller University, was submitted to the National 
Cancer Advisory Board.
13 
This committee had been constituted after growing 
criticism of the Virus Cancer Program (VCP) indicated that an evaluation--not un-
like the evaluation of NIH by the Wooldridge committee a decade earlier--was in 
47 
order. As then-NCI director Rauscher (1978) told us: 
...I appointed the Zinder Report, and I called for it. That 
was my thought. I'll never forget, I talked at coffee with 
Benno Schmidt, and I said, 'Benno, are we going to have to 
appoint a major group to come in and take a look at this from 
the outside?' On the way back into the room, we talked to 
Jim Watson and Jim thought it was a fine idea. Before that 
morning session was over, Jim had walked around my side and 
given me a slip of paper and given me names that he suggested, 
and I used most of those names, as a matter of fact, to the 
chagrin of many of my colleagues in virology. 
The Committee's comments were generally harsh and pointed: 
First, the committee said, the VCP is too expensive. 
(It costs about $50 million to $60 million a year and 
consumes slightly more than 10 percent of the total 
NCI budget.) Second, the program must be opened up to the 
scientific community. At present, it is run by a hand-
ful of persons who have undue control over large amounts 
of money, which goes to only a limited number of labora-
tories. Furthermore, the individuals who award contracts 
are in a position to award them to each other, which some-
how does not seem quite right. The committee called for 
new management practices and a good stiff measure of 
peer review by outside scientists (Culliton, 1974:143). 
Centralization of (S)VCP funds was perhaps the most devastating finding of the 
Zinder report. A few individuals were found to dispense enormous sums of money 
annually, notably $19 million to Robert Huebner (Chief, Viral Carcinogenesis 
Branch, NCI), $7 million to George Todaro (Chief, Viral Leukemia and Lymphoma 
Branch, NCI), and $12 million to Robert Manaker (Chief, Viral Biology Branch, 
NCI) ,
14 
It was only natural that when the SVCP was formed [initially to 
explore the possible role of adenoviruses in malignancy], a 
small group of investigators was involved--an 'in group.' It 
now represents a somewhat larger 'in group' of investigators. 
Administratively its procedures lack vigor, are apparently 
attuned to the benefit of staff personnel and are full of 
conflicts of interest. Because the direct targets have be- 
come fuzzy since 1964, although the available funds have con-
tinued to grow, the program seems to have become an end in 
itself, its existence justifying its further existence. In 
doing so, it is eroding what is good in both the grant and 
contract mechanisms, a fact which may account for the 
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widespread antipathy to SVCP in the scientific community 
(quoted in Hixson, 1976:132). 
A non-NCI researcher informed us: 
I was on the National Cancer Advisory Board when the Zinder 
report was proposed, and I was one of those who asked for it 
because there were clear deficiencies in the VCP program. There 
were other weaknesses, because it grew up too fast and things 
were done that probably would have been done a little bit more 
rationally, and there were areas of abuse, which should be 
corrected, and that's essentially what the Zinder report tried 
to do. And I don't think there was any serious question in 
the minds of the Zinder Committee, and it certainly didn't appear 
in their report, that the science that was being done by the 
VC people was excellent, and there was no doubt that of all 
programs that were going on at NCI, as well as the clinical 
ones, it was the one that was producing the new science for 
the buck. And so all in all the thrust that was in the report 
was to correct obvious undesirable features of the VCP. 
[Administrative?] Administrative, and conflicts of interests 
which existed between in-house people and out-house research 
(I use the word out-house advisedly)--and so on and so on. I 
think that's perfectly okay. The Zinder report was a good one 
and it served a useful purpose and to a large extent was imple-
mented. It took a lot of time because you had to tread on some 
very powerful toes to get it done, so it took awhile. But 
Rauscher started to move in that direction and Maloney cer-
tainly did, and a lot of wings were clipped, not completely--
I mean, those things are very difficult to reverse. 
Rauscher (1978), in defending the Program, observes that 
When we first got that ten million dollars in 1966, the Congress 
said, 'You can have the money, but you've got to spend it by 
contract.' That was a mandate, too, incidentally. We had no 
choice. We couldn't go grants if we had wanted to.... And at 
that time we used some of the money in order to get off the 
ground very quickly through a sole source contract, some of 
which was to support what I thought were exceedingly good ideas 
by in-house investigators. Well, as the dollars became bigger 
and as these fellows became successful in the sense of publishing 
many papers, they began to be resented by people on the outside 
who had to compete for every dollar they had--again, totally 15 
 predictable. So, yes, when you say that the second criticism 
was one of administrative arrangement, or of the technique of 
management, you are absolutely right. 
Rauscher also impressed upon us: 
Number one, during all of that Program, or much of that Program, 
you could not grant outside of the United States, but you could 
use the contract mechanism, and a major focus was opportunities 
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abroad, so they had to use the contract mechanism. Number 
two, you can not grant to a commercial organization. You must 
use contracts, by law and regulation. Number three, many of 
our best scientists in this country happen to be in commercial 
organizations and you want to do work with the best scientists. 
And that was, I think, overlooked [by critics].... I was there 
when Mr. Nixon flew out of the sky and said, 'You now have 
Fort Detrick.' Not many of us wanted it. I think it was wise 
to take it, not only for cancer, but for the rest of NIH, as I 
thought at the time. But, in effect, in getting no more money 
to take over Detrick, he was saying, 'We're going to turn 
swords into plowshares for cancer research; for the public of 
this nation, you run that facility.' We were not given any 
positions to run it, and we recognized immediately that we would 
have to contract with somebody to do it--the way Union Carbide 
runs Oak Ridge, as an--incidentally, that was the model we 
used. And, again, I think wisely so. So in effect, right now 
we're locked in. We, meaning the NCI, is locked into something 
like 25 to 30 million dollars a year to keep a very good facility 
with very good people going, but it does not have the same peer 
review because it can not, for individual projects, within that 
25 million dollars. It's almost like NCI. My people at NCI got 
their support as a cut off the top. You know, they had to write 
an annual report and so forth, but in effect their support was 
guaranteed. They didn't have to write a grant request, contract 
request, or what have you. Neither do the individual scientists 
at Litton. 16 When they compete, they compete for...a three year 
kind of project...and for that period of time, they're pretty 
safe. 
Finally, another academic researcher offered this view: 
The difficulty that the Zinder report was talking about was the 
prime commercial laboratories that were getting fortunes to do 
very little, and they seem to have been too well entrenched to 
have been touched, at least under the previous administration 
at NCI. And there you have to look very closely at the power 
of a single man [Maloney?]. Without a doubt. And he deter-
mined what was being done and he would go up and hire a posi-
tion, and if he didn't get payoffs from all these people, 
then he certainly got payoffs in terms of friendship and 
self-importance. And that was, for some reason, untouchable. 
And that grated on our scientists' self-image and pride, be-
cause it was such poor work being funded, such an enormous 
amount of it, that that gave the VCP a terrible name for 
producing the worst kind of science at the most cost. But in 
fact the VCP also supported some of the very best work around 
the country. And had they been hard-nosed about what they 
supported, and had they insisted on the principle that you 
only support good science in the best places doing that kind 
of science, instead of saying, 'Well, we have all this money 
and we have to spend it somehow, and we've got all these guys 
who think they know what they're doing, so we'll give them 
the money and let them work,' then they would be in much 
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better shape now. 
The administrative upshot Df the Zinder Committee review was, in Rettig's 
(1977:301) words, an 
'opening up' the VCP program specifically through the establish- 
ment of an NCAB oversight committee, a reconstitution of the 
contract review groups, and the elimination of contract work 
that was an extension of VCP scientists' intramural research. 
The NCAB did establish a subcommittee, chaired by Dr. Harold 
Amos of Harvard Medical School, to monitor the program's re-
sponse to the Zinder Committee's recommendations. The VCP, 
on its part, has established an advisory committee of non- 
program scientists to provide advice on broad directions of 
resource allocation, promising lines of scientific inquiry, 
and means of application of research findings. The contract 
review process was also modified to increase the rigor of 
review of individual contract proposals. The Amos sub- 
committee, in its report to the NCAB of June 1975, indicated 
its general approval of the program changes. 
In addition, NCI has sought to streamline and standardize its procedures for 
reviewing contract and grant proposals alike (see below) though many of our 
interviewees doubted the effectiveness, or even the sincerity, of the announced 
(see Rauscher, 1974) modifications.
17 
The Zinder Committee also concluded, however, that "about 50 percent of the 
program is supportable at some level" (Culliton, 1974:144). This criticism is 
partially based, like that of Greenberg quoted earlier, on intellectual invest-
ments of scientific administrators and researchers that are organizationally and 
politically expedient, but reproachable on grounds of knowledge (or ignorance): 
Many of those in administrative control of the VCP are men whose 
careers are intimately linked to the idea that there is a rela-
tionship between certain RNA viruses and human cancer. Much of 
the research the program supports is aimed at substantiating 
this idea. VCP support of research on DNA viruses is compara-
tively small. The committee recommends...an integrated program 
with a built-in series of checks and balances to prevent the 
special notions of particular individuals from carrying the day. 
For example, should the first definitive [human] cancer virus 
turn out to be a papova virus [one of many suspected DNA viruses], 
the VCP would be in a strange position. It scarcely supports any 
work in this area and only recently has gotten seriously involved 
with the DNA viruses such as herpes (Culliton, 1974:144). 
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How then, should such "internal" criticisms be utilized by the sociologist of 
science? The criticisms certainly provide a baseline for interpretive evaluations 
of research in progress which sociologists can then approach from other perspec-
tives; in short, they help generate hypotheses. But there would appear to be an 
even more central role for criticism that incorporates the scientists' evaluations 
of organizational principles and practices. Critical comments on organizational 
structures mirror evaluations of the proper workings of science; they are state-
ments about the state of science and the norms of reason. These norms of science 
have a function within the knowledge component of science. Unlike the traditional 
conception of the norms of science (Merton, 1942; Barber, 1952), which supplants 
the knowledge function with an organizational maintenance function, a formula- 
tion is needed which restores to centrality the cognitive orientation of researchers. 
It should take into account the scientist's vocation as it becomes manifest both 
in knowledge and in organizational criticism. 
In short, a single set of institutional norms no longer suffices as behavioral 
guides in the context of Big Science. What other norms have scientists embraced? 
Some answers have already surfaced in our examination of the cancer war and one 
of its most potent programs. Now we must pause to analyze systematically these 
normative manifestations of Big Biology. Then we shall return to the question of 
sponsorship of modern biomedical research at the institute level, i.e., how did 
the cancer mission affect allocations to NTH institutes other than NCI? After such 
analysis, the debate over the viral etiology of cancer may appear less idiosyn-
cratic in (a) the funding priorities of research on dread disease and (b) 
the discovery process within biomedicine. 
Interpreting Criticism: In Search of New Norms? 
From 1971 to the present, the largest single biological research offensive that 
the U.S. has known has been directed by the National Cancer Institute. That the 
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funding of this institute relative to others within NIH has been the target of 
criticism flows not merely from disparities in allocations, but from disparate 
interpretations of the ethos underlying those allocations plus the rhetoric of the 
scientific community to secure them and "ensure" the advancement of scientific 
knowledge. To reflect on this rhetoric is to speculate on its antecedents and to 
recognize its implications for alternative normative structures in the community. 
To quote Nelkin (1975a:21-22): 
Merton's formulation [of the scientific ethos] was developed to 
reaffirm the values of science when it was faced with 'frontal 
assaults on its autonomy,' but assaults on science and its 
accepted values have become more vigorous, stimulated by growing 
perceptions of the importance of science to society and of its 
social consequences...The scientific community is ill-equipped 
to deal with external pressures. The norms of science [may] 
govern the behavior of scientists within their field, as if 
science were by definition an autonomous enterprise. But unlike 
physicians, or those in professional practice, scientists share 
no well formulated set of norms to govern their relationship 
outside the scientific community. The instinct to protect 
professional autonomy is backed by few rules that would guide 
an appropriate collective response. Thus, when unable to 
ignore persistent challenge, scientists often take refuge in 
reasserting the neutral character of their work and the 
irrelevance of political and social considerations. 
This, too, according to Mulkay (1976), is a rhetorical device to loose upon 
unknowing nonscientists. Yet the ideological outworkings of such a stance are there 
for all to observe, including other scientists. Some observers, notably Mitroff 
(1974), have seized upon the ambivalence of scientists--which Merton (1965) saw as 
endemic to the institution--to demonstrate the counternormative behavior of indivi-
dual scientists. These scientists see "interestedness" and perhaps non-"communality" 
(i.e., secretiveness) as rational responses to the hostility and incessant pressures 
which controversial research fosters, whether it be analyses of moon specimens 
which are taken to support pet theories about the origin of the moon, or commit-
ment to a viral etiology explanation of cancer. 
Both of these examples entail expensive, nationally visible and funded (NASA 
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and NCI, respectively) research. Both underscore what Orlans (1975) calls the 
"indiscriminate advocacy of knowledge" and Salomon (1972) terms "the mating of 
knowledge and power." Not only are scientists playing multiple roles of princi-
pal investigator, peer reviewer and science advisor, but they are instrumental in 
the disposition of knowledge, i.e., as advocate, popularizer and mediator vis-a-vis 
lay publics. Is it no wonder, then, that ambivalence arises from ambiguities 
regarding the cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of science? There is no con-
sensus within the scientific community on these dimensions, yet in dealing with 
non-scientific publics, near unanimity must often be sounded if research efforts 
are to be sustained. As Nelkin (1975a:26) suggests, 
...scientists engaged in research in policy-relevant areas may 
select research questions that are based less on disinterested 
judgments of intrinsic scientific merit than on organizational 
imperatives of their institution, or on their perceptions of 
social utility. 
To recapitulate, what Merton characterized as the scientific ethos, the univer-
sal cultural values of the scientific community, can now be seen as a class of 
stereotypical, ideal, institutional norms. Their technical counterpart, in the 
sense of more transitory research-specific content (theory and method) which con-
strains practitioners and guides the evaluation of knowledge-claims is what Mulkay 
(1969) labeled cognitive norms. These norms may encompass counternormative 
behavior and all the ambivalence that scientists may experience over a particular 
research problem at a particular time. A third class of norms, however, we may 
term rhetorical since they provide 
vocabularies of justification, which are used to evaluate, justify and 
describe the professional actions of scientists, but which are not 
institutionalized within the scientific community in such a way 
that general conformity is maintained 18 (Mulkay, 1976:654). 
The import of this third class stems from scientists' selective presentations of 
views to support their collective research interests. Rhetorical norms, therefore, 
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govern the articulation of an occupational ideology to non-scientific, but power-
ful, publics such as government agencies and congressional committees.
19 
With these classes of norms in mind, we can return to the original context for 
this discussion and reassess the assertion that the mission orientation of contem-
porary biomedicine, especially cancer research, seems to demand a new type of re-
search organization. What has been the funding structure that propels cancer 
research and how does it compare with other research (i.e., institutes) within 
NIH? 
NCI AND FUNDING PROSPERITY
20 
The two major sources of funds in the U.S. for the support of cancer research 
have been the American Cancer Society (ACS) and the National Cancer Institute (NCI). 
The smooth increase of the ACS curve since 1948 (see Figure 3.2) is no doubt indi-
cative of a set of public beliefs about cancer and its cure.
21 
Numerous polls 
have demonstrated (e.g.,Rauscher, 1974) that cancer is the most feared of diseases 
in the U.S.; it is therefore easy to imagine that this fear has been translated 
into concrete contributions to ACS.
22 
Comparing the amounts of ACS and NCI monies in Figure 3.2 lends credence 
to the claim that interpreting shifts in funding is perilous. Had cancer re-
search reached a critical "take-off" threshold of knowledge in 1958 due to the 
cumulative effects of ACS and NCI funding prior to that year? Was the funding 
merely part of the overall increase of governmental interest in science stimulated 
by the Russian Sputnik? Did it stem from the general shift in attitude toward 
governmental patronage of science in the post-World War II era? Or had the public 
displaced the responsibility of biomedical progress from private organizations 
and piecemeal contributions to the federal government and its massive fiscal 
capability?
23 
All of these explanations are somewhat plausible and the acceptance 
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FIGURE 3.2 
AMOUNT (IN LOGARITHMS) OF APPROPRIATIONS TO 
THE NATIONAL CANCER MISTITUTE 	COWRIBUTIONS TO THE 
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIFIY, 1938-1970a 
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of one does not preclude the validity of another. 
But the steady gain in ACS contributions can be contrasted with the irregu-
larities of the NCI curve. Kenneth Endicott (1969:2), former director of NCI, has 
argued that the major perturbations are due to the Korean and Vietnamese wars, 
respectively. This appeal to the conflict of funding interests and the need for 
federal allocation priorities in times of national mobilization is intriguing 
even though it appears obvious. Clearly, one is accustomed to such historical 
macro-level explanations when major external political clashes of nations are 
at issue. But when it comes to major internal shifts in priorities, e.g., 
wars on poverty, cancer, etc., allegations and debates about the impact of 
funding displacements ensue. With the passage of the Cancer Act in 1971, 
...though separate agency status was not secured, substantial 
autonomy for NCI was obtained. The new law gave NCI a renewed 
and expanded mandate, raised the formal status of its director, 
provided the expectation for vastly increased funds, and in the 
budgetary by-pass mechanism established a procedure for asserting 
autonomy. The resolution of the legislative debate left the 
cancer crusade advocates with much of what they wanted, but gave 
the opponents the symbolic and material accomplishment of de-
feating the proposed separate agency recommendation (Rettig, 
1977:291). 
Although the "separate and unequal" doctrine was defeated by the Act, NCI had 
become the "I" in NIH. Querying Frank Rauscher about this privileged status, we 
heard a straining for consistency (that was not very convincing): 
Interviewer: Does it matter that the Cancer Institute is inside the NIH 
fold or outside the NIH fold? 
Rauscher: Oh, I always thought it should be inside. 
Int: But you were a minority on that. 
Rauscher: Yeah, I was not very popular when I said that, among some of the 
outside lobbying groups and pressure people. I was always firmly convinced 
that in order for the Cancer Program to be healthy, we needed a healthy NIH. 
We're part of a family. I wanted our people to be able to collaborate 
with somebody over in Allergy, or Dental, or what have you, and I think that 
was the right way to go. It could have been chaos, but it wasn't. 
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On the record, Rauscher has maintained that the decrease in funding of other 
institutes of NIH had little to do with the national mobilization against cancer: 
These reductions cannot in fairness be attributed to the 
existence of the National Cancer Program, although this 
would be difficult to prove beyond a doubt. On the other 
hand, it is just as difficult to prove that the other 
institutes would have received more funds if the National 
Cancer Program did not exist. In fact, I am told by 
people in the Office of Management and Budget that the 
latter would not have happened in 1972 to 1974 (Rauscher, 
1975:118). 
Off the record, however, there is some wavering: 
You know, when I was there [at NCI] I was a member of the 
Executive Branch, appointed directly by the President, and 
there are some restrictions under that situation. I didn't 
experience too many though, thank God. I was fortunate enough 
to have people like Mary [Lasker] and Benno Schmidt, 24 in parti-
cular, and direct access to the White House, so that when I 
went to a Congressional hearing and they said, 'But couldn't 
you use more money,' I would be able to say, 'Absolutely, my 
Board and Panel tell me we can use another 185 million.' And, 
I guess, almost no other Director of any other Institute had 
that option. 
Elsewhere in our conversation Rauscher remarked: 
You have got to remember the first two years--the critical 
first two years--of major budgetary increases, that money 
did not come out of HEW funds. It came out of a pocket 
that Mr. Nixon had in OMB. So there was no way that we 
were competing for funds out of the HEW pocket. Very few 
people understand that point. In later years, that was 
not true. We were competing for what money was available 
in HEW. 
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In other words, the conquest of cancer was not entertained publicly as a 
viable explanation of concomitant decreases in funding for the other institutes. 
What were "obvious" macro-level explanations in fundings fluctuations when military 
mobilization was at issue are not invoked when the macro-level mobilization 
against cancer is raised. Privately, Rauscher is more sanguine--and less per-
suasive. His explanations differ in their intuitive (rhetorical?) appeal depending 
upon where, when, and to whom he is speaking. His is essentially a non-zero 
sum interpretation: "We won but you didn't lose." Yet it is plausible if 
allocations to NCI are seen as independent of the total NIH budget. To do so 
deflects interpretation away from questions of internal restructuring
25 
 (i.e., 
contracts vs. grants) due to programmed missions and increased allocations. 
Even if the funding of NCI and of the rest of NIH are totally independent 
events, one must still deal with the whole picture of biomedical organization and 
support in the U.S. Adopting a critical perspective on the interaction of bio-
medical policy and its organization within the development of biomedicine, one 
finds that disproportionate funding of the institutes leads to "relative 
deprivation" which in turn elicits wholesale criticism of the total 
biomedical funding policy. Clearly, attitudes toward funding policy cannot be 
reduced to comparisons of the relative funding levels of the various institutes. 
Some comparisons, however, are instructive. Even though there was a fairly 
stable number of grants reviewed during the late 1960's and the approval rate 
was increasing slightly, the actual award rate was decreasing dramatically. This 
condition was created by changes in the rate of increase of available funds, 
shifts in the proportion of renewals to new grants, and the increase in the 
average cost of research grants. A tense situation was brewing within all 
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of the institutes. Kalberer (1975:478-479) observes that: 
In the case of NCI, award rates started to fall off dramatically 
beginning in 1968 as a result of the leveling off of Congressional 
appropriations, Consequently, there was a steady downward trend 
in the percentage of traditional grants awarded, particularly 
new grants, in 1970 the Institute reached its all time low level, 
awarding only 30% of approved grants. With passage of the Act 
of 1971 this trend was reversed. Within the last 4 years, at 
least 50% of all approved new applications have been awarded. 
[Clearly] the halcyon years, prior to 1964, when NIH, including 
NCI was able to fund more than 90% of all approved applications, 
have passed. 
Relative deprivation could be perceived, thus, not only between institutes 
but also within institutes as funding capabilities changed in the post-war era. 
The new wars on cancer and heart disease did not occur in a vacuum; the basis for 
a feeling of deprivation was already present. What made the situation intolerable 
to many, however, was that they were being deprived more than others. It is this 
phenomenon of relative deprivation which Rauscher (1975:118) was trying to defuse. 
But even while Rauscher proposed the independence of the NIH and NCI budgets, 
Kalberer (1975:477) notes that "As a result of the decrease in budgets of the 
other institutes, NCI is making every effort to fund outstanding applications 
assigned initially to other institutes but not payable because of lack of funds." 
Recognition of the interdependence of the institutes seemed to obtain more in 
practice than in administrative theory. 
To illustrate the problem of relative deprivation, Figure 3.3 has been 
constructed from the raw data reported in Table 3.1. In this figure the pro-
portion of total NIH allocations received by an institute (the six major NIH 
institutes which have been in operation since at least 1954 are represented) for 
a given year is expressed as a proportion of the total NIH allocations it received 
during the entire twenty year period. Hence, 
y = 100 
x proportion of allocation in a year  
proportion of allocation over total 
20 year span (1954-1974). 
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FIGURE 3.3 
CHANGES IN RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF FUNDING OF SIX 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH INSTITUTES, 1954-1974a 
..... • 9. 
U. 	 ", -8.1'  
....... ,v, 
■ 	 . 	 .•• 
s•• ' 	• 
1%. .• 	
Avf \\* 
o 	  
• 
National Cancer Institute 
• National Heart and Lung Institute 
• National Institute of Dental Research 
National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism and Digestive Diseases 
	 A National Institute of Allera and Infectious Diseases 
o o National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke 
a  Comipled from National Institutes of Health (1975). 
TABLE 3.1 
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS WITH PERCENTAGE ANNUAL INCREASE FOR SIX 
INSTITUTES OF THE NATIONAL INSTTIUTES OF HEALTH, 1954-1974 a 
Years 
Institutes 
% A NHLI % A NIDR %A NIAMDD % A NIAID % A NINDS % NCI 
1954 20.237 15.168 1.740 7.000 5.738 4.500 
1955 21.737 7.41 16.668 9.89 1.990 14.37 8.270 18.14 6.180 7.70 7.600 68.89 
1956 24.978 14.91 18.898 13.38 2.176 9.35 10.840 31.08 7.775 25.81 9.861 29.75 
1957 48.432 93.90 33.396 76.72 6.026 176.93 15.885 46.54 13.299 71.05 18.650 89.13 
1958 56.402 16.46 35.936 7.61 6.430 6.70 20.385 28.33 17.400 30.84 21.387 14.68 
1959 75.268 33.45 45.613 26.93 7.420 15.40 31.215 53.13 24.071 38.34 29.403 37.48 
1960 91.257 21.24 62.237 36.45 10.019 35.03 46.862 50.13 34.054 41.47 41.487 41.10 
1961 110.300 20.87 86.900 39.63 15.500 54.71 61.200 30.60 44.000 29.21 49.600 19.56 
1962 142.836 29.50 131.912 51.80 17.340 11.87 81.831 33.71 55.341 25.78 70.812 42.77 
1963 155.742 9.04 147.398 11.74 21.199 22.25 103.388 26.34 66.142 19.52 83.506 17.93 
1 964 143.194 -8.06 127.423 -13.55 19.166 -9.59 107.699 4.17 67.117 1.47 84.471 1.16 
1965 150.011 4.76 124.824 -2.04 20.083 4.78 113.050 4.97 69.847 4.07 87.821 3.9 7 
1966 163.768 9.17 141.462 13.33 23.677 17.90 123.203 8.98 77.987 11.65 101.153 15.18 
1967 175.656 7.26 164.770 16.48 28.308 19.56 135.687 10.13 90.670 16.26 116.296 14.97 
1968 183.356 4.38 167.954 1.93 30.307 7.06 143.954 6.09 94.442 4.16 128.633 10.61 
1969 185.140 .98 166.928 -.61 29.984 -1.07 1'1.3.888 -.04 96.840 2.54 128.934 .23 
1970 190.486 2.88 171.378 2.67 30.809 2.75 146.619 1.90 103.695 7.08 107.365 -16.73 
1971 233.160 22.40 194.925 13.74 35.440 15.03 137.986 -5.89 102.368 -1.28 103.502 -3.60 
1972 378.794 62.46 232.627 19.34 43.388 22.43 153.337 11.13 109.118 6.59 116.731 12.78 
1973 492.205 29.94 300.000 28.96 46.991 8.30 167.316 9.12 113.414 3.94 130.672 11.94 
1974 551.191 11.98 302.915 .97 45.565 -3.03 159.447 -4.70 114.000 .36 125.000 -4.34 
a 
Compiled from National Institutes of Health (1975). 
This transformation yields a good indicator of systematic changes in funding 
priorities within the NIH institute structure. In a completely stable situation, 
the proportions of funds would remain constant for the entire period, i.e., a 
line (y) would not deviate from 100 in Figure 3.3. Because of numerous altera-
tions in the relative proportions of allocations within NIH, however, relative 
gains and declines in funding position are revealed that signal possible changes 
in the relative importance of research areas, political climates, etc., of the 
individual institutes. 
Reflection on Figure 3.3 must be prefaced with some observations and caveats. 
First, it must be noted that several of the institutes did not come into exis-
tence until 1954. The origin years of the six are as follows: National Cancer 
Institute (NCI), 1937; National Heart and Lung Institute (NHLI) and National 
Institute of Dental Research (NIDR), 1950; National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID), National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism, and 
Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD), and National Institute of Neurological Diseases and 
Stroke (NINDS), 1954. That NCI and NHLI enjoyed a comparatively favorable 
position in 1965 is probably due largely to the fact that they have been in 
existence for a period, are therefore well-entrenched, and have acquired funding 
momentum.
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The three institutes founded in 1954 are, in this respect, at 
a decided disadvantage, since they are still searching for and developing new 
programs. In this light, the low position of NINDS, for example, signifies its 
low priority and status within NIH in 1964. 
Second, we recognize that change of relative position may derive from 
several types of organizational shifts. An example is the rapid ascent of NIDR 
in 1957 fostered by an unusually large appropriations increase (177 percent, 
Table 3.1). In contrast, the precipitous "descent" of NINDS in 1970 is no 
doubt a result of the creation of the National Eye Institute (1968), a spin-
off from NINDS (with independent budget status in 1970). Interpretations thus 
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must be tempered by an historical understanding of the development of the institutes; 
indeed, one should be encouraged that the transformation in Figure 3.3 mirrors 
the alterations of policy which we have already noted. 
Our primary concern, of course, is the realignment of the institute structure 
in the 1970's, for this is the period of disjunctive, selective funding shifts. 
The stability observed from 1964 to 1969 dissipates markedly in the 70's. Al-
though some of this may be accounted for, as has been seen, by the reorganization 
and separation of new institutes from established ones, the general tendencies 
seem to follow economic exigencies, new orientations to basic and applied research, 
and new policy decisions based on these views. From 1970 forward, the alloca-
tions of funds to NCI, NHLI, and NIDR (again consult Table 3.1) stand in stark 
contrast to the allocations of funds to NIAMDD, NIAID, and NINDS. The patterns 
of percent increase per year are striking in this period; the concentration of 
funds, especially in NCI but also in NHLI and NIDR, greatly depresses the re-
lative positions of the remaining groups. 
The new policy decisions which are implied by Figure 3.3 are the National 
Caries Program (1971) and the National Cancer Act (1971). These were both 
mostly mission-oriented programs designed to eliminate widespread afflictions. 
They were intended to produce visible results just as the intensified efforts 
of NASA had accomplished their targeted tasks. Institutes geared to less 
dreaded or universal diseases seemed to fare the worst after installation of the 
new policy. As was clear from Figure 3.1, NCI funds were increasing relative 
to the entire NIH allocations, but now from Figure 3.3 it can be seen that even 
relative to the other major institutes it was fairing quite well. 
But the National Cancer Institute also had reasons to feel slighted in the 
years prior to the Cancer Act. Figure 3.4 displays the percentage of NCI grants, 
both in numbers and in dollars, of all NIH grants from 1946-1974. The Shannon 
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years (1955-1968) were years of decreased cancer funding relative to the growth 
of NIH. Numerous new institutes had been formed during these years and their 
funding demands had cut into the percentage of biomedical funds devoted to cancer 
research. Given the broadened institute structure and the shifts in funding 
priority during the 1950's and 1960's, it is quite understandable why the funding 
policy changes in the 1970's should create tension. With more institute "mouths" 
to feed, combined with an overall decrease in biomedical research allocations 
(Figure 3.1), non-cancer research was threatened by the war on 
cancer. Some areas of knowledge were being heavily funded while other areas were 
losing support. Even those institutes which were experiencing increases in their 
funding allocations during the 1970's were not increasing as rapidly as NCI. 
Absolute and relative deprivation was being felt by all except those involved 
with cancer. 
From Figure 3.4 one can see another source of tension surrounding the 
funding of cancer research. The National Cancer Institute had for some time 
distributed larger grants than had normally been the case with the other institutes 
(see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). This tendency toward the concentration of grant support 
continued to increase after 1973: 20 percent of NIH funds were given to 17 
percent of the NIH grants. But the real cause for concern on the part of some 
biomedical researchers can only be seen if the changing contract structure, in 
addition to the granting structure, is taken into account (Rauscher, 1974; 
Kalberer, 1975).
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For the decade of prosperity enjoyed by NCI has brought 
to a head the philosophical clash over strategies for funding biomedical re-
search. To contract or not to contract for knowledge: that is the question. 
Knowledge from Mission Money? Pro and Con  
For some, the steady rise of "contracted" projects within NIH signals a 
major intellectual shift, and therefore, an encroachment on biomedical research. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
PERCENTAGE OF NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AMOUNT OF 
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GRANTS AWARDED 
BY THE NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, 1946-1974a 
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TABLE 3.2 
NCI CONTRACTS AND GRANTS, 1962-74 a 










# Grants/ 	$ Grants/ 
# Contracts $ Contracts 
1962 1914 47.501 .Q25 /07 24.3 ,227 17,888 1.955 
1963 1792 54.530 .030 266 26,3 .093 6.737 2.073 
1964 165Q 55.735 .034 316 30.3 .096 5.222 1.837 
105 1514 56.531 .037 267 37.6 .141 5.670 1.503 
1 ,966 1482 64.327 .043 250 33.1 .132 5.928 1.943 
1967 1481 71.018 .048 294 40.0 .136 5.037 1.775 
1968 1335 71.599 .054 364 41.2 .113 3.667 1.738 
1969 1228 73.003 .059 367 41.4 .113 3.346 1.763 
1970 1182 71.371 .060 566 43.5 .077 2.088 1.641 
1971 1214 88.392 .073 G86 71.0 .103 1.770 1.244 
1972 1504 120.555 .080 843 116.8 .139 1.784 1.092 
1973 1804 157.196 .087 1058 132.8 .126 1.705 1.184 
1974 2241 219.846 .098 1600 199.2 .124 1.401 1.104 
aCompiled from National Institutes of Health (1975:117f). 
TABLE 3.3 
NIH (EXCLUDING NCI) CONTRACTS AND GRANTS, 1962-1974a 
 (Amounts in Millions of Dollars) 
Number of 	 Amount/ 	Number 	of Amount/ 	# Grants/ $ Grants/ 
Year 	Grants Amount. 	Grant Contracts Amount 	Contract # Contracts $ Contracts 
1962 13061 	324.598 .025 	50 	2.7 .054 	261.220 	120.221 
1963 	13441 376.378 	.028 121 9.7 	.080 111.083 38.802 
1964 13592 	442.189 .033 	172 	9.9 .058 	79.023 	44.666 
1965 	13669 482.232 	.035 138 8.8 	.064 99.051 54.799 
1966 13671 	536.646 .039 	272 	18.0 .066 	50.077 	29.814 
co 
ON 	 1967 	12456 522.295 	.042 413 43.8 	.106 30.160 11.924 
1968 11785 	554.419 .047 	721 	56.2 .078 	16.345 	9.865 
1969 	11207 554.578 	.049 832 60.9 	.073 13.470 9.106 
1970 10157 	530.782 .052 	1540 	61.8 .040 	6.595 	8.589 
1971 	9849 587.852 	.060 1932 83.4 	.043 5.098 7.049 
1972 10020 	684.486 .068 	2166 	133.2 .061 	4.626 	5.135 
1973 	9510 657.998 	.069 2785 164.0 	.059 3.415 4.012 
1974 11170 	857.331 .077 	2449 	160.2 .065 	4.561 	5.352 
aCompiled from National Institutes of Health (1975:117f). 
Longo (1973:2080) has pointed out that from 1971 to 1972, contracts in NIH increased 
by 47 percent but research grants by only 19 percent. The concentration of this 
funding mode in the new mission oriented programs (46.4 percent of NCI and 27.7 
percent of "heart" funds administered in 1973 through contracts) was particularly 
visible to this critic. Why does he find this trend alarming? Longo replies: 
Of perhaps less general knowledge are the recipients of the 
largest contracts...Of the 10 largest NIH contracts, 7 were 
awarded to organizations other than universities. The data 
are perhaps even more startling when one looks at total 
contracts by various organizations. Of the five largest con-
tractors, only one is a university. Of the 12 organizations 
with total contracts over $3 million, only five are univer-
sities and one the National Academy of Sciences. Forty-
seven percent of NCI contracts were with profit making 
organizations in 1972. Route 70S near Bethesda, MD, is 
rapidly developing into a biological Route 128 composed 
of industrial contractors nourished by NIH. This trend, 
stemming from a quick-solution psychology, tends to re-
move research from the university and award it to indus-
try. It remains unclear to what extent 'cost-plus research' 
by profit making corporations will deprive academic 
scientists of funds to pursue fundamental queries...It is 
clear, however, that well-motivated scientists must provide 
for themselves and that they can find reasons to shift 
allegiances toward contract funding, especially if the 
squeeze is tight enough and long enough. Contract research, 
which is largely for product delivery or procurement pur-
poses, has the potential of undermining a scientist's 
commitment to patient, systematic and often frustrating  
discovery-oriented basic research (Longo, 1973:2080, 
italics added). 
Contracts thus represent for Longo an approach to research which conflicts with 
certain well established views concerning the nature of the discovery process 
within biomedicine. It seems unfair to his argument to say simply that it re-
presents academic versus industrial, production-oriented, values or basic ver-
sus applied or clinical research (see Gordon and Marquis, 1966; Cotgrove and Box, 
1970; Comroe and Dripps, 1976). The real problem is the nature of the discovery 
process and the manner in which biomedicine progresses ("cognitive norms") and 
whether or not the contract mechanism is a threat to this development ("rhetorical 
norms"). 
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The events which have precipitated such criticism can be clearly seen in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. By comparing these tables one notes that contracts have 
always played a more important part in the research effort of NCI as compared 
with the rest of NIH. While the trend is clearly toward more contract research 
in general, NCI is already expending virtually 50 percent of its external research 
monies on contract research. This rate is almost five times greater than the 
rest of NIH. This coupled with the fact that NCI in 1974 accounted for 40 percent 
of all NIH contracts and 55 percent of all research money expended through con-
tracts reveals the basis for concern. If one simply shifted monies from one 
institute to another and allowed the internal research allocation mechanisms 
to operate, then the overall funding structure of NIH would increasingly resemble 
that of the favored institutes. In other words, by highlighting the fund- 
ing of NCI research, as the war on cancer did, the internal patterns 
of research expenditures, likewise, gradually began to dominate NIH policy. 
The war on cancer thus precipitated a more rapid shift toward contract research 
than would have occurred through more gradual evolution. As one of our inter-
viewees put it: 
You know, the point of the whole Cancer Institute is that it 
grew too fast. And without any decent quality control. It 
turns out a lot of people knew that and knew what they were 
doing. Which was simply taking advantage of a positive poli-
tical climate in order to get as much as they could. And when 
you get it, you have to spend it. If you give it back, they 
are not going to give you as much again. So they were quickly 
finding ways to spend lots of money. And what [present NCI 
director Arthur] Upton's got to do now, and I think he recog-
nizes that, is revamping things so that the amount of money 
that they have can now be utilized better, effectively building 
on the political clout or threat of his predecessors to re- 
structure the Institute so that it uses that money effectively. 
Because we're under an enormous amount of pressure. 
Part of the pressure "back then" was translated into NCI's mandated commit-
ment to fund non-academic research. Some of the largest contractors were 
Litton Industries (22 contracts in 1972 totaling $16.5 million, Microbiological 
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Associates (12 contracts in 1972 totaling $7 million), and Flow Laboratories 
(9 contracts in 1972 totaling $4 million) (Longo, 1973:2080), all private labora-
tories which are heavily involved in NCI cancer research. These profit-making 
laboratories have been intimately associated with the war on cancer since its 
inception (see Anonymous, 1971a), e.g., Litton Bionetics, a subsidiary of Litton 
Industries mentioned above, received in 1972 a $6.8 million contract to renovate 
the biological warfare facilities at Fort Detrick for cancer research (Anony-
mous, 1972). Microbiological Associates, a subsidiary of Dynasciences Corporation 
which in turn is a subsidiary of Whittaker Corporation, has been very active in 
developing and producing tissue cultures as well as reagents for viral and 
immunological research for the cancer effort. Flow Laboratories, which dominates 
the European market of "biological products" through its laboratory in Scotland, 
has long been a "commercial leader in the virology field" so that it could 
easily shift when the war on cancer began to "studying the role of cancer viruses 
as potentially causative agents in human cancer"
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(Monaghan, 1974:19-20). 
The point that must be emphasized is that the contract mechanism did signal 
a shift in organizational focus of biomedical research and NCI can legitimately 
be given credit for hastening the shift by emphasizing non-academic contract re-
search. Contract research was rapidly becoming a symbol of targeted research 
which was executed outside the academic setting by quasi-governmental research 
laboratories. The National Cancer Institute and its war on cancer was perhaps 
the single most important instrument for establishing this new organizational 
image for biomedical research. 
The question once again arises: are the new organizational forms amenable 
to the structure of knowledge within the biological sciences? The concern of the 
scientist must center on the nature of the discovery processes within biomedical 
fields and how this interfaces with the goals that society would like to attain. 
If the policy maker is asked to heed this esoteric rationality--e.g., confluences 
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of knowledge--then perhaps the technical input-output models devised in and applied 
to other fields are indeed inappropriate for biomedicine. As one biochemist puts 
it, 
The current supports at NCI and the National Dental Research 
Institute for crash programs for solutions to cancers and 
dental caries are dangerous, in that they raise false hopes 
for solutions to problems for which an insufficient basis of 
knowledge is available. An example is the long-standing ex-
pensive Cancer Chemotherapy program which has had only slight 
success. It is based on the 'pill concept'; every disease 
can be cured if the right pill can be found (Pigman, 1973: 
1733). 
The contract, mission-oriented type of research represents for many biolo-
gists not just a violation of institutional norms, but the violation of cog-
nitive norms, of epistemologies ("how do I know, learn, and discover within 
biomedicine") which, in turn, implicate some fundamental etiological understandings 
about the biological world. The etiological conflicts seem to be a particularly 
resilient bone of contention, for if one acknowledges that biological existence 
is an evolving, systematic phenomenon, then the quest for any causal ex-
planation (as is often latent in mission-oriented research) can lead to a kind 
of "sectarian" science. Pigman conveys the difficulty in the chemotherapy tradi-
tion of cancer research; the "pill concept" or some other quick technological fix 
can distort and perhaps hamper the development of research programs in biomedicine 
(Zubrod et al., 1966). NCI's discouragement of research on the viral induction 
of cancer in 1938 (see Chapter 1) and its official reinstatement with the establish- 
ment within NCI of the Laboratory of Viral Oncology
29 
 are excellent illustrations 
of changes in etiological emphasis. Whatever the merits of this emphasis (as 
embodied in the Viral Cancer Program), some regard the vast sums of support for a 
viral etiological explanation of cancer as the epitome of sectarian science. 
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Reordering Cancer Priorities  
With Frank Rauscher's retirement as NCI director in 1977, a cloud of 
doubt hangs over the future place and value of virus research in the cancer pro-
gram. Some (Culliton, 1977) predict a shift in emphasis to environmental car-
cinogenesis research and a corresponding deemphasis on viral oncology. Others 
lament that with Moloney's ouster, the VCP is slowly being dismantled. On the 
fate of the Virus Cancer Program, American Cancer Society Executive Vice-Presi-
dent Rauscher hopes that 
it increases and expands. Again, recognizing that it's not 
the Virus Program that it was in 1966...Rather than detract 
from that Program, they ought to increase it. I know of no 
other way even conceivable right now, in which we can pre- 
vent many cancers in common denomicator ways despite the 
fact that we're breathing carcinogens right now and we're 
going to continue.... There's no doubt about the fact that 
the environment out there will continue to be contaminated 
for some time. We're not going to do away with the auto-
mobile, the asbestos in its brake linings, very quickly. 
So it's good to try and to talk about cleaning up the 
environment, cutting down on emission, and so forth. I'm 
very much for that, but we have to find a better way of living 
with things that we really don't want to do without, or can't 
do without, such as that form of transportation. We're also 
talking about a hundred different diseases that people call 
cancer. Cancers are formed, we think, by many different 
mechanisms, so we can not, it seems to me, look for a 
hundred ways of preventing these diseases. We've got to look 
for some common denominator ways of preventing cancer des-
pite the fact that we're going to continue to be exposed 
to carcinogens for our bad habits. We shouldn't smoke, but 
fifty-five million of us do, and we have to worry about 
those brethren, too, as a matter of fact. The identifi-
cation of pieces of the virus, of RNA viruses, or of 
genetic information, and the only thing that can code for 
that, as far as we know in all of biology, is an RNA 
tumor virus. 
With the switch to specific program goals and a contract orientation to 
cancer research, there can also occur concomitant pressures for the adoption of 
(a) specific treatments, e.g., chemotherapy, or (b) certain causal 
explanations, e.g., viral etiology. It is the switch from broadbased support of 
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basic research to the concentrated betting on certain cures or causes that creates 
tensions for scientists with cognitive orientations to cancer other than those 
which currently enjoy popularity and political power. Given the necessity of 
explicit policy decisions in a national mobilization effort such as the war on 
cancer, there is always a danger that organization will lead to the perception 
of out-right "governmentalization" or the "politicization" of science
30 
in the 
form of privileged research traditions or approaches. As Rettig (1978:4) recently 
stated in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Nutrition; 
...the research effort that came after 1971 legislation looked 
very much like the effort that preceded it. Only is was on a 
grander scale. Though an internal planning effort of sub-
stantial proportions was undertaken, that effort had relatively 
little connection with the resource allocation processes and 
did little to set priorities for a period of resource scar-
city. Programs that were important before the Act remained 
important afterwards. But concern for environmental car-
cinogenesis, for instance, emerged forcefully only in the 
mid-1970s after the identification of and attendant publi- 
city about asbestos, vinyl chloride, and other chemicals 
as occupational and environmental hazards of cancer-causing 
potential. And that concern emerged primarily from sources 
outside the national cancer program rather than from within 
it. It is my impression, furthermore, that the concern 
for the relationship of nutrition and diet to cancer 
shares a similar history. 
So in 1978 we hear echoes of the same allegations made about organizational 
priorities in 1974: 
Bad feelings about the VCP exist because there are a lot of 
virologists who share the same goals. The ones in the VCP 
were very rich. The others, who are just as good were 
very poor (James Watson in Culliton, 1974:144). 
Watson, an outspoken proponent of funding for basic research,
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draws qualified 
support for his position from two unlikely sources--the "fortuitous" cancer 
war team of Benno Schmidt and Frank Rauscher: 
We need to have a cadre of very good scientists just 
following their noses and not worrying about relevance. 
I felt very strongly about that, too; and I had no 
opposition, therefore, from many of my people, certainly 
not from the Congress. So there's a place for an ivory 
tower, but not at the expense of transferring technology 
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that might benefit people.... The thing that I feared most was that 
as funds became tight and as there was a reaction against the 
cancer establishment because it was privileged status--this was 
absolutely predictable five or six years ago, but as that happened, 
and as it's happening now, the first thing that Congress would do, 
I think, would be to attack the image of an ivory tower privileged 
government laboratory, and they would delete funds from our own 
in-house organization or operation. I felt that would be devas- 
tating, really, to the national program, not only to NCI. So 
now that NCI is involved in technology transfer, in cancer control 
programs, I don't think there are many in the Congress who could 
say, 'Those guys out there just want to be left alone; they want 
to be funded simply because they are scientists; and they don't 
give a damn about Johnny with leukemia out in my district.' 
They can't say that because there's an honest-to-God commitment 
on the part of most of those people to help in various aspects 
of the National Program, be it review, site visiting, advice 
to the Director, advice to people on the outside, advice to the 
Congress, for that matter. They're heavily involved, more so 
than any other institute, and I think that's healthy (Rauscher, 
1978). 
Even more telling is the language of Benno Schmidt's fifth report to the president 
on the National Cancer Program: 
There is no question that there has been during this period 
an enormous extension of our science base and our knowledge 
as a result of the vast amount of highly excellent funda-
mental basic research that has been supported. But this 
extension of our knowledge only underlines how vast are the 
areas of ignorance which remain. Just as the past five 
years have brought a greatly enlarged science base, they 
have also brought important improvements in the clinic in 
dealing with cancer, but here again our progress only serves 
to emphasize how far we have to go...[we] cannot afford not 
to support basic research...For we are, in truth, profoundly 
ignorant about the real nature of cancer (quoted in Rettig, 
1977:319). 
The promise of 1971, fortified by massive mission money, has carried the 
Cancer Act to reauthorizations in 1974 and 1977. 	Since fiscal 1972, NCI 
appropriations have cumulated to over $5 billion, but the rhetoric has subsided. 
Today, Schmidt's report is restrained; Rauscher speaks of "over-promising" and 
"over-expectancy," and a reverse transcriptase researcher comments on the politics 
of cancer: 
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...the whole Yarborough Committee operation that set in motion 
the war on cancer occurred before the RT was known....RT fit 
very comfortably into their idea that there was new progress 
in cancer research that was exploitable...It was certainly, 
then, used politically a lot. There is no question. And, in 
a sense, appropriately, because it did represent the first 
opportunity to deal with a class of viruses that everybody 
knew were important, and no one knew how to deal with. And 
up to the time that we discovered RT, the amount of sensible 
work on RNA tumor viruses was miniscule before it was dis-
covered. And just by providing a tool, never mind about 
providing a concept, it changed (overnight) the whole ability 
of handling these viruses. And since Huebner had imbued 
everybody with the belief that these were the key to cancer, 
there was no question that this was an enormous political, 
as well as scientific, breakthrough. The tough thing is to 
really say to what extent it mattered. 
CONCLUSIONS 
If 75 percent of all biomedical research carried out in U.S. medical schools 
and over 40 percent of all university research is funded by NIH (Gustafson, 
1975:1060), then through shifts in policy such as that embodied in the war on 
cancer NIH can exert tremendous pressures on the selection of research topics.
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Scientists will pursue the opportunities which increased fundingmakes possible.
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But there is more. For our discussion of modifications of funding mechanisms 
within cancer research has suggested an interplay among normative structures by 
which scientists abide, but which they must also manipulate to protect their vested 
intellectual or organizational interests. By listening to criticisms by scien-
tists one can quickly ascertain their concerns qua researchers. The norms to 
which they appeal are cognitive norms of argumentation within biomedicine and not 
the institutional norms which sociologists are enamored of belaboring as operative 
or obsolete. They may at once be both, yet this possibility is less compelling 
than the rhetoric scientists employ to communicate the policy-laden tensions to 
which their intellectual processes and products are now subject. 
Whether regarded with Panglossian optimism or Faustian fore-
boding, science is increasingly vulnerable to forces that 
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intrude on its boundaries, permeate its social organization 
and expose its internal contradictions. Yet these forces may 
also bring about a more realistic awareness of the interpenetration 
of science and the social order (Nelkin, 1975a:27). 
The social organization which money begets can be studied by conventional socio-
logical means, but without an understanding of the normative structures, insti-
tutional, cognitive, and rhetorical, which guide and rationalize scientists' be-
havior, analysis of social organization is rendered hopelessly incomplete.
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Accordingly, by weighing both the discovery processes within areas such as 
cancer research and the criticisms which scientists have directed toward organi-
zational tensions, sociologists of science can rethink their research tasks. The 
structure of reasoning can be pivotal in defining areas for study (see Chapter 2), 
while the search for violations of cognitive norms can translate the criticisms 
which scientists articulate into vital research questions about their "vocabularies 
of justification." For what we have here is not just Big Biology and contract 
research; what we have is ideology. And in Gouldner's (1976:36) words: 
It is one of ideology's essential social functions - of con-
siderable cognitive relevance - to stand outside of science 
itself, and to reject the idea of science as self-sufficient 
or self-grounded. In other terms, ideology's critique of 
science, its refusal to let science be theonly judge of it-
self, its public exposure of science's selfishness,...and 
the limits of science, mean in effect that: ideology 
functions as an epistemology of everyday life. 
For the biomedical researcher, science policy has created a new rhetorical voca-
bulary to vouchsafe the epistemology of their everyday science. 
POSTSCRIPT TO PART I 
Perhaps the most difficult hurdle for sociological analysis of bio-
medical problem domains is the nature of the interdependence of scientific know-
ledge and social organization. If the organization of science can distort and 
even thwart the development of science (as numerous scientists quoted above 
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seem to think), then how can one ever know what the biological argumentation 
process should be? This question can be reduced to the perennial quandry: can 
one ever progress from what "is" to what "ought" to be? The answer is, of course, 
no, if one assumes that both the "is" and the "ought" only represent different 
aspects of the same social system. All becomes relative from such a perspec- 
tive on the social system or, for the case in point, the social system of science. 
But by considering the possibility that the development of science should not be 
equated with the development of the social system of science, one begins to 
fashion a realist 	theory of scientific growth which captures the force of know- 
ledge. Knowledge seems to develop in spite of its formal and informal social 
structures. This can occur because of the "predominance of cognitive orientation" 
(Bohme, 1975:241) which scientists share and which shapes the parameters of their 
intellectual work. 
By recognizing the predominant knowledge function of science, a norm is 
established by which a meaningful analysis of science can proceed. Like all 
knowledge, sociological knowledge of scientific development must be tested and 
retested to eliminate as much "noise" as possible from its theoretical and 
empirical understanding (see Mendelsohn, 1977). The sociologist must learn to 
separate the organizational "distortions" of science from the organizational 
forms which facilitate scientific growth and development. If, as a consequence 
of this argument, sociologists are forced to inform themselves of the content 
of scientific specialties then the payoff is that sociologists can speak force- 
fully to science policy questions. The "is" of the scientific reasoning process 
which develops in spite of, but which can be gravely thwarted by, the social 
organization of research, can then provide norms--institutional, cognitive, 
and rhetorical--for the "ought" of science policy. 
Through a series of arguments the theoretical groundwork has been installed 
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for the following chapters. First (Chapter 1), the unfolding of a research tra-
dition, cell transformation and the confluence patterns which precede discovery 
were discussed. Second (Chapter 2), by demonstrating how meaningful "slices" 
of biomedical research can be isolated for sociological analysis, it was seen that 
biomedicine features a "structure of relevance" or distinctive rationality for 
the formation and study of problem domains. Third (Chapter 3), we examined how 
scientists routinely separate in their own thinking the organization of science 
from the structure of argumentation which advances their research, and how funding 
policy and the rhetoric of the mission can facilitate, deter, but surely alter 
the advance of knowledge. 
With these perspectives in place, we are prepared to survey the intellectual 
history of reverse transcriptase, a domain of research within viral cell trans-
formation, and then analyze quantitatively the various local, sectoral, and inter-
national configurations of collaboration and research organization within the 
cancer community. This is the challenge of Part II: bring the biomedical 
rationality we have discerned to bear on the interpretation of growth and specia-
lization of a problem domain. In so doing, perhaps a new policy orientation to 




The widely acknowledged architects of that policy--a coalition working from within 
and without the government in behalf of the Cause--were prime congressional movers 
John Fogarty and Lister Hill, NIH Director James Shannon, and the tireless champion 
in the private sector (notably the American Cancer Society), Mary Lasker. For an 
assessment of Lasker's role see Rettig (1977: especially Chapter 2). 
2
The National Cancer Act of 1971, Public Law 92-218, 92nd Congress, Senate 1828, 
December 23, 1971. This was followed by the National Cancer Act Amendments of 
1974, Public Law 93-352, 93rd Congress, Senate 2893, July 23, 1974. 
3
As JesseSteinfeld, then Surgeon General, testified before the Senate health sub-
committee deliberating on S.34 (the blueprint for the Conquest of Cancer Act), 
"...scientists are like other people, they tend to go where the funds are, where 
the opportunities are, and it is conceivable that if we spend an enormous amount 
of money in the cancer program that people who might be more productive in other 
programs would move to cancer programs..." (U.S. Senate, 1971a:55). 
4
The National Heart and Lung Institute did not have long to wait, however, before 
they would also be singled out for special funding. In 1972 the President signed 
the National Heart, Blood Vessel, Lung, and Blood Act (U.S. Senate, 1972; see 
Culliton, 1973). 
5Again, in the words of Rettig (1977:14-15): 
The conflict between the fundamental research strategy and the cate-
gorical disease strategy, then, actually masks five closely related 
issues. What kind of research is to be supported or favored--basic 
or clinical? What instrument of support is to be used--the grant 
or contract? Who is to make the authoritative decisions allocating 
support--the external scientific community, the professional staff 
of an institute, or the advisory council to an institute? Who is 
to be supported--university scientists or industrial researchers? 
What is to be the extent of formal research planning--limited, sig- 
nificant, or very extensive! This potpourri of issues was basically 
rolled into one in the debate over the National Cancer Act of 1971. 
The overarching issue concerned the most appropriate strategy of 
research management for conducting the war against cancer. 
Specifically, the 1970 report of the Panel of Consultants called for a "comprehen-
sive national plan" for cancer. Toward this end, then NCI director Carl Baker 
initiated an effort to develop the National Cancer Program. As Louis Carrese, then 
Baker's assistant and now Associate Director for Program Planning and Analysis, 
describes it: 
We brought together the whole scientific couEutunity, 250 people selected 
out of two thousand names submitted by every professional society 
in the country. Then we had 40 planning sessions to develop the 
National Cancer Program plan. The people who were there doing it 
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were fighting the process. During the very time they were doing it 
[over a four-month period], they were fighting it.... It's like the 
drowning person who says, 'Dear God (if there is one), save my soul 
(if I have one) from hell (if there is one).' So some of these guys 
were saying, 'I'm going to participate in this national planning 
session, but I will maintain my integrity as a scientist. 	You know, 
if the plan is fine, all right. It it isn't I've knocked it enough.' 
This process is, well, one of the most fantastic things I've ever 
witnessed. We turned it over to the community; we were very low 
profile by design. 
In Rettig's (1977:300) view, 
The plan, though the object of much concern and criticism, has 
proved useful in explaining the cancer program to the Congress and 
the public and in providing general directions for NCI. It has not 
been used to any significant degree in governing the actual day-to-
day management of various NCI programs. Neither Schmidt nor Rauscher 
have displayed more than mild support for the management importance 
of the plan itself. 
6
This appears to be a particularly difficult request to make of sociologists. 
For as Bohme (1975:215) has argued, 
What sociology of science has generally failed to do is to account 
for the primacy of cognitive orientation with regard to the social 
organization of science. In contrast to this, the organization 
of science was constructed solely on the basis of motivational orien-
tation: thus Storer took the demand for creativity and competent 
reaction to be fundamental, and Hagstrom the system of sanctions. 
To be sure, the organization on the level of motivation is a reality, 
but it presupposes organization on the cognitive level. 
7
As Carrese (1978) told us: 
...our major problem here was to convince people that, first, in 
addition to the traditional support of many bench investigators, 
we should try other things. The cancer problem is certainly 
large enough to accommodate more than one approach to try and 
solve it, and these would not supplant or replace things, but 
these new approaches would be complementary and supplementary, 
and introduce ways for us to think on how best to distribute and 
invest the total resources we've got across a whole spectrum of 
activities. Not just basic research, but other kinds of research, 
other kinds of developments, and now cancer control, with the 
passage of the Act. 
8
Indeed, as Rettig (1977:171) points out, the AAMC and FASEB (the Federation of 
American Societies for Experimental Biology) "did most of the work mobilizing the 
academic medical-scientific community to oppose S.34." 
9
Schmidt has been the chairman of this panel since its creation in 1971. 
10
Speaking at a "retrospective" on the Cancer Act of 1971 in 1976, Harold Amos, 
an NCI stalwart in the academic sector, put it this way: 
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All investigators in the biological sciences are agreed that serendipity 
is their most valuable ally. What emerges unexpectedly in experiments 
is often the most critical information obtained in the experiment 
and those findings are especially pertinent to new directions in 
approach and understanding, throwing new light on old questions. It 
is imperative that the state of mind of the investigator be such as 
to perceive the unexpected for what it may ultimately be worth. Program 
relevance dictates a selection in registering of observations that 
may categorize as worse than useless a contradictory finding (Amos, 
1977:262). 
11
Mulkay (1976) stresses this very point in recognizing that the rhetoric of 
scientists' pronouncements or "vocabularies" vary with the audience they are 
addressing. Such a strategy serves multiple purposes, e.g., maintaining distance 
between the scientist-experts and the lay public, and promulgating the search-for 
truth ideology as a rationale for decrying impediments to the flow of research 
dollars. 
12
Testifying before the Rogers subcommittee, Baltimore himself argued that 
Cancer should not be separated from the rest of biomedical research, 
and a crash program atmosphere should not be created, because...the 
American people should not be misled into thinking that a cure for 
cancer is imminent (quoted in Rettig, 1977:235). 
In view both of the rhetorical excess surrounding the cancer legislation and the 
political side of the debate with which the American Cancer Society was aligned, 
it is ironic, as Baltimore (1978) commented to us, that 
The American Cancer Society has an extremely honorable record supporting 
basic science, from way back. And lots of people will tell you, lots 
of people who do work on bacteriophages and general problems of mole-
cular biology, will tell you that the key support that they got was 
from the American Cancer Society at a time when NIH wouldn't touch 
them. The Cancer Society has had very far reaching effects, very 
good panels, and has very good luck with its approach toward its 
goal of research; in fact, more so then than now, now that they are 
caught up in the climate of 'Let's get cancer cured.' 
13
It appears however, that this Report of the Ad hoc Review Committee of the  
Virus Cancer Program was never officially accepted by the Board. As late as 
February, 1978, the report was not catalogued in the National Library of Medicine. 
So its status remains somewhat of a mystery to us, although it is cited as "sub-
mitted" in draft and final report forms as November 1973 and March 1974, respec-
tively, in Rettig (1977:369). The reports we secured through the courtesy of 
Dr. Rauscher's office at ACS bear these same dates. 
14
Todaro and Huebner were quick to deny any wrongdoing in this policy or their 
role in implementing it when we queried them--separately--about it. 
15
The first criticism we suggested to Rauscher was an intellectual one, essentially 
that mentioned in the draft of the Zinder report itself: 
It was the assumptions that were wrong. There did not, nor does 
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there exist, sufficient knowledge to mount such a narrowly targeted 
program. Basic ignorance of the mechanism involved in the cancer 
process, even in animals where a viral etiology is definitively 
established, is so profound that it is difficult to be certain 
where to begin, much less organize a focused attack. 
16
Litton Bionetics "manages" the Frederick Cancer Center at Fort Detrick for NCI. 
There is more than a little ambiguity as to which researchers are on which payroll, 
a problem Rauscher and other of our interviewees readily acknowledged. 
17
Again, in justifying the past, but assessing the present situation (now as an 
ex-NCI spokesperson), Rauscher (1978) confides: 
One other reason, incidentally, we use the contract mechanism so 
strongly in our own Viral Oncology Program, is we were able to 
award contracts in something like 2 or 3 months, with peer review. 
Right now, it's taking the NCI something like 12 months to award 
a grant, and almost 16 to 18 months to award a contract. Nobody 
wants a contract anymore. The people at NCI don't want to manage 
contracts. It's just too much regulatory red tape. But we could 
use contracts at that time to abet a Congressional decision to 
give us money to get on with the virus cancer search. You couldn't 
do that with a grant. 
18
An example of the animus expressed by clinically-oriented M.D.s toward the basic 
scientists who opposed 5.1828 is this excerpt of a letter from the medical director 
of St. Jude's Children's Research Hospital received by Rep. Rogers: 
They were 'far removed from the sick,' had 'little appreciation' 
of what was involved in turning scientific findings into 'effective 
prevention and treatment of disease,' and 'have not and never will 
take part in direct application of scientific research of the 
Lhealth of the American people.' The choice before the subcommittee... 
was whether it wished to 'represent American science or the 
American people' (quoted in Rettig, 1977:361). 
One clearly hears the rhetoric, though it rings hollow. 
19
The recent recombinant DNA controversy and NIH deliberations on security guide-
lines for university laboratories have brought representatives of the scientific 
community into encounters with a formidable "external" power--city councils deter-
mined to minimize the biohazards in their communities. 
20
For a good survey of shifts in funding policy as well as levels of funding within 
the National Cancer Institute after the National Cancer Act, seeKalberer (1975). 
For a comparable analysis of the whole NIH for the decade preceding the Act see 
Kennedy et al. (1972). 
21 It would be interesting, for instance, to see how these dollar "votes" of con-
cern for cancer correlate with such phenomena as the increased numbers of elderly 
within the population (i.e., more individuals in higher cancer risk categories), 
and with macro-economic (recessions) and -political (wars) events (see below). 
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22
This fear has also been translated into massive Mary Lasker-Ann Landers-inspired-
letter-writing-to-your-congressman campaigns, as that which was urged when S.34 
was nearing a vote in April of 1971. 
23
The role of the American Medical Association during the gradual displacement of 
private support of governmental programs for biomedical research is of particular 
interest; the AMA remained aloof. With the passage of the National Cancer Insti-
tute Act four decades ago, the AMA warned that "The danger of putting the govern-
ment in a dominant position in relation to medical research is apparent" (Strick-
land, 1972:14). On the "neutrality" of the AMA toward medical research, Strick-
land (1972:154-155) states: 
For a long time it was as though the organization which represented 
most of the thousands of practicing physicians had vacated the field 
of medical research policy.... Ultimately, the Association came to 
realize that there was a major and ironic incongruity in the fact that 
the organization claiming as a cardinal tenet the advancement of good 
health for all citizens had had nothing to do with the greatest effort 
of the century to make possible the attainment of that goal. 
24
Commenting on the Schmidt-Rauscher team as a "fortuitous" combination, one NIH 
official has said: 
[Rauscher] could cause a convulsion in NIH if he tried. A director 
who wished to exercise the full range of authority could beg a hell 
of a large degree of autonomy from NIH. But Rauscher had played 
it very carefully (quoted in Rettig, 1977:298). 
25
Several of our NCI interviewees stressed that the laboratory is the basic unit 
of the Cancer Institute (and all of NIH, for that matter), whereas the program is 
more flexible and perhaps more ephemeral in carrying out specific parts of the 
mission at various times. Rauscher (1978) agrees with this distinction, and that 
accurately reflects NCI planning. 
26
Along with mental health, cancer and heart (which is now called Heart, Lung and 
Blood) are also the only institutes with statutory obligations for disease control. 
27
Recall that the changing relationship between grants and contracts dates from 
1965 and the advent of the Special Virus Leukemia Program. 
28
It is noteworthy that an NCI-Litton Bionetics team, Gallo (NCI), Yang and Ting 
(Litton Bionetics) were the first to find the enzyme reverse transcriptase (see 
Chapter 4) in human leukemia patients (see Anonymous, 1970a). The wedding of the 
private and the governmental laboratories has (as shall be seen in Chapter 5) 
created distinctive collaborative patterns within cancer research. 
29
This did not occur until 1971, thus it took NCI 23 years to change its mind and 
effect a new policy. 
30
0ne of the difficulties with analyzing the politicization of science is that all 
the readily available examples occur in political situations which are easily 
condemned, e.g., the case of T.D. Lysenko (see Medvedev, 1969). It would seem, 
however, that even the most gradual policy shifts can subtly politicize a research 
problem by establishing a reward system which is out of touch with the present 
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scientific realities (see Haberer, 1969; Ezrahi, 1971; Nelkin, 1975b). 
31
More recently, Watson has severely criticized those scientists who advocate a 
moratorium in recombinant DNA research (see Nelkin, 1978). 
32
Gustafson (1975:1063) estimates that "proposals to NCI now account for roughly 
half of all applications to NIH." 
33
This is, of course, an "externalist" view of history (introduced in Chapter 1). 
It would be useful to know if researchers have actually changed their research 
programs or merely altered their rhetoric to fit under the umbrella of the cancer 
program. See van den Daele et al. (1977:222-227) for a discussion of such "re-
labelling" in science. 
34
Funding is often spurned by sociologists since it seems to explain everything 
about the growth of science on the macro-level, or it appears to explain nothing 
at all on the micro-level. It appears, on the one hand, to drive the system, but, 
on the other hand, its influences are so subtle that they are shrouded by other 
variables (see Orlans, 1971; Price, 1969). 
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A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE RESEARCHERS 
INTRODUCTION 
By now, the discovery of reverse transcriptase--from antecedents to 
outgrowths--constitutes yet another chapter in the history of science. Like 
other episodes of competition, multiple discovery, and subsequent bursts of 
activity and new knowledge, this history has been an unfolding research 
drama enlivened by several characters. The "characters" to which we refer 
are not only the most "public" of figures, the Nobel laureates Temin and 
Baltimore. Indeed, the cast includes the Spiegelmans, Greens, and a coterie 
of NCI luminaries who have infused the history of reverse transcriptase with 
a personality and intensity all its own. 
Although the emphasis throughout our historical treatment has been on 
the science involved in reverse transcriptase--from the brilliant to the 
mundane--we have not forgotten the scientists responsible for the episodes; 
we have simply postponed analysis of "the cast" until now. The analysis we 
shall conduct is a blend of disciplinary approaches which have developed 
independently and for distinct intellectual purposes, yet share a common 
unit of analysis--the individual. 
Historians of science, enamored of "great man" theories and the text-
book heroes who seem to take quantum leaps in the quest for knowledge while 
the rest of us imperceptively inch along, have devised a method for retracing 
those leaps; it is called "prospography" or "collective biography" of elite 
groups of scientists (for a review, see Pyenson, 1977). Likewise, sociolo-
gists of science, preoccupied with productive, visible, academically-employed 
natural scientists, have pursued career patterns analysis or the demography 
of scientists, particularly the stratification and mobility of this technical 
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labor force (e.g., Harmon, 1965; Hargens, 1969; Folger et al., 1970; Cole 
and Cole, 1973; Zuckerman, 1977). 
Despite the fact that both of these approaches celebrate the ultra-
successes in science, they have been practiced in relative isolation of one 
another. Prosopography has featured small samples and anecdotal accounts 
of backgrounds, e.g., cultural and parental influences, while demography 
has been synonymous with large sample, quantitative analysis. In the former, 
the elite are deceased; in the latter, they are alive but unencumbered, i.e., they 
are not surveyed by mail, phone, or in person. Instead, their careers are 
seen "unobtrusively" as educational and job histories, augmented by measures 
of research performance. 
While the "disciplined myopia" with which these respective tools have 
been applied is cause for contemplation (see Thackray, 1977), they each, in 
their multivariate breadth, have much to offer when invoked at the present 
research site. For our goal is to construct a set of biographical profiles 
which correspond to our several categories of "structurally interesting" 
persons in the history of RT. These profiles will "contextualize" the 
linkages between people and events by presenting backgrounds, tracing in-
fluences, and pausing to examine some idiosyncratic details that occupy 
the "backstage" of RT. This is as much an "ecological" approach--relating 
an aggregate people to an intellectually, spatially, and organizationally 
diverse environment--as it is demographic--following the movements of the 
aggregate and their ideas within this environment (see Duncan, 1959). 
This analysis is also motivated by a sobering reality of science: 
like other workers, scientists are constrained by their work environment. 
Yet too often, as Whitley (1977:23) correctly observes, scientists are treated 
like "free agents" subject to no local whim, indeed, carving a career swath 
through an array of institutions which make few demands but liberally 
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dispense the rewards of promotion, remuneration, local status, etc. A 
more accurate portrayal--as the literature on creativity in work settings 
attests (e.g., Pelz and Andrews, 1976)--is that scientific work and its 
myriad expressions of productivity are fundamentally shaped--and comprised--
by social, political, and logistical imperatives (see Hargens, 1974, for 
comparative data). The intellectual process, in other words, occurs in 
anything but a vacuum: it is collaborative, competitive, and part of a 
larger ongoing activity. The climate is established and maintained by the 
employing organization, and in accordance with its priorities and commit-
ments. Ideally, scientists are accommodated by these organizational impera- 
tives, but, then again, they are hired to help satisfy those imperatives and fulfill 
the commitments. Realistically, because research laboratories and academic 
departments are more stable than those who inhabit them, i.e., pass through 
as "intellectual commuters" (Price, 1963), these organizations exert pressures 
designed to maximize their success. If, in the course of work, scientists 
can subsume their goals under those of the organization, mutual goals may 
be achieved. Often, however, this is not the case. A coincidence of various 
means may never develop, and tensions may arise extending from the sacrifice 
of personal goals to the obstruction or subversion of organizational goals. 
Such a range of "fit" between individual scientists and their organi-
zational affiliations is apparent in the reverse transcriptase domain. For 
example, the glaring contrast in program foci, magnitude, and research 
style between NCI labs and academically-based labs--even the more visible 
and well-funded of the latter--invites some assessment of the scientists 
involved in various team efforts, the constraints under which they labored, 
and the ways they adapted or became reconciled to the kind of scientific 
work they were compelled to do. 
Another question concerns the intellectual breadth of individuals and 
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teams. For most, reverse transcriptase represented but one problem 
deserving two, perhaps three, years of investigation, among many problems to 
he explored along, say, the virology or epidemiology trail. Whence 
did the RT researchers come--in an intellectual sense? What was their 
graduate training? And where did they go after contributing to RT? Evi-
dence on these queries begins to put RT in the wider perspective of cancer 
and biomedical research in general. It also suggests the demographic and 
ecological patterns which biomedical researchers create, both in response 
to their innermost intellectual cravings and to the unique attractions 
which certain labs, programs, and institutions hold. It is through analysis 
of scientists in organizations, therefore, that the RT case study assumes a 
more inferential meaning--about intellectual migrations, research produc-
tivity, career vagaries, and the institutionalization of scientific work. 
THE DATA 
The subjects for biographical profiling are 58 RT researchers whose con-
tributions to the domain were revealed (as discussed in Chapters 4-6) in 
several ways: prolific authorship or publication of highly (co)-cited pre- 
or post-discovery articles, membership in a visible NCI or academic lab team, 
and frequent acknowledgment as a reader, supplier of materials, etc., in 
RT articles. These structured criteria, of course, were used for selecting 
scientists as interview targets. Hence, our 15 interview subjects are 
among the 58. Twenty-six others were sent letters soliciting a current 
curriculum vitae and 18 complied (a 69 percent response rate). In addition, 
dissertation abstracts were located for 31 North American Ph.D. holders in 
the Comprehensive Dissertation Index. The main source of biographical data, 
however, was American Men and Women of Science (12th and 13th editions). In-
deed, 43 of 51 (or 84 percent) of the U.S.-based members of our purposive 
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"structural" sample were listed in this directory, as testimony to their 
accomplishments and status relative to the scientific community-at-large 
(see Crane, 1965). To augment these data with information about overall 
research performance (not just publication in RT), we consulted the Source  
Index of the Science  Citation Index and coded articles published into three 
periods: pre-discovery, 1965-69; post-discovery domain development, 1970-74; 
and domain transition (i.e., "current" applications of the enzyme), 1975-76. 
Note that these periods refer to stages of RT activity, although the articles 
coded encompass all serial publications spanning the 11 years 1965-76. In 
• 
this way RT publication can be assessed vis-a-vis total research productivity. 
As a further comparison, a second aggregate of scientists was defined 
as the complement of the structural sample: those who published in RT, pub-
lished prior to the discovery, and were highly cited, or were often acknow-
ledged in RT articles, but had not gained the recognition of inclusion in 
AMWS and for whom no other biographic information could be found. For these 
41 scientists, the identical publication data were coded from the Source  
Index, so that comparative analysis of research performance within and without 
RT between this heterogenous "control group" and the purposive sample would 
be possible. 
THE PROFILES 
A Provisional Construction  
No significant differences exist between the structural sample as a 
whole and its constituent subsamples in chronological or professional age. 
For all 58 scientists, their mean and median birth years are 1933 and 1936 
respectively, while the mean year in which they received their highest 
degree is 1963 (median = 1966). If we consider Ph.D.s only (n = 37 or 64 
percent), or those with M.D.s (n = 16), or both the Ph.D. and M.D. (n = 5), 
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no deviations obtain. Thus, the principal researchers in RT were, on average, 
34-37 years old (+ 9 years) at the time of the discovery of the enzyme and had 
barely concluded a quarter of their projected 35-year postdoctoral career. For 
many, therefore, the advent of RT came during service in first professional posi-
tions, a "period effect" (Ryder, 1965), which we examine below in terms of 
subsequent research interests and productivity. 
Returning to origins for a moment, however, we note that of the 55 
scientists for whom Ph.D./M.D. institution information was secured, 15 were 
trained in 12 schools located in 10 different foreign countries. Ten of 
these foreign-trained scientists took postdoctoral positions in visible 
U. S. labs, e.g., Spiegelman's and Baltimore's, and most of these found 
permanent jobs in academic departments and private institutes, e.g., Sloan-
Kettering and the Salk Institute. Among the 40 American-trained scientists, 
30 different institutions granted the M.D. or Ph.D. with only the University 
of Illinois (4) and Washington University (St. Louis) (3) awarding three or 
more such degrees. The doctoral fields most represented--irrespective of 
national origin--are biochemistry and microbiology. 
Although the period of transition from initial research interest to 
involvement in reverse transcriptase was brief for most of the RT principals, 
two kinds of migrations can be traced to reveal shifts in careers. One mi-
gration is intellectual (see Chubin, 1976:459f for a review), namely, 
current field of (self-) identification compared to field of highest degree, 
as reported in AMWS. Table Cl summarizes this professed migration or change 
of identification. The most striking pattern discernible in the sparse data 
of this table is that five years after the discovery of reverse transcriptase, 
15 researchers (37.5 percent) regard virology as their primary field identi-
fication; this includes 5 of the 12 M.D.s. That 11 researchers would have 
gravitated to this field suggests a real intellectual attraction or "pull" 
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TABLE Cl 
MATRIX OF FIELD IDENTIFICATION AT TIME OF PH.D./M.D. RECEIPT 
AND IN 1975-76 FOR PRINCIPAL REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE RESEARCHERS 
PHD/MD FIELD 
FIELD IN 1975-76 
Microbiology Biochemistry Virology 
Molecular 
Biology Otherb 
Microbiology 4 1 1 6 
Biochemistry 3 1 2 6 
Virology 4 4 
Biology (unspecified) 3 3 
Chemistry 1 1 - 1 3 
MD 2 1 5 2 2 12 
Othera - - 1 5 6 
n 6 5 15 5 9 40 
aZoology, genetics, biophysics, physiology, and anatomy. 
bZoology, genetics, biophysics, anatomy, chemistry, immunology, bacteriology, pathology. 
SOURCE: American Men and Women of Science, Thirteenth Edition (1976) 
effect. This is supported, indeed amplified, by the specializations and 
research interests listed at the end of the AMWS biographies. Although the 
number and terminology of these responses are open-ended, a coding of key-
words reveals that three-fourths of the biographies contain "viruses"; one-
fourth mention "RNA viruses" in particular. Other variants include "viral 
oncogenesis," "oncornaviruses," "tumor viruses," and "replication of viruses." 
Still another dimension of professional identification is society/ 
association membership. With multiple responses possible, one-half of the 
researchers listed affiliation with the American Society for Microbiology, 
a third with the American Association for Cancer Research, less than a fifth 
with the American Society for Biological Chemistry or the American Chemical 
Society. 
A second kind of migration, that between employment sectors (e.g., 
Crowley and Chubin, 1976), may also be indicative of shifts in career plans 
and goals. To examine this possibility, we constructed Table C2. Signifi-
cantly, we observe virtually no inter-sectoral migration from the time of 
discovery to the peak period of domain growth. What is obscured on the 
diagonal is the amount of within-sector institutional migration. Other data 
(on median time employed by an institution) suggest that such movement is 
fairly common (an average of once every three years). Apparently, however, 
the work contexts distinguishing the three sectors--or the barriers which 
preclude entry and exit from them--are sufficient to retain research per-
sonnel. Several of our interviewees stated, in fact, that "academic research-
ers wouldn't work" in NCI labs,' and, likewise, "NCI researchers can't afford 
to go back to academia, even to a well-endowed medical school." Clearly, the 
rewards differ in each setting, making a traversing of the boundaries sepa- 
rating academiafrom nonacademia a rare occurrence (only 4 cases in Table C2). What 
slippage does occur seems to stem from an M.D.'s desire to enter clinical 
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TABLE C2 
MATRIX OF EMPLOYMENT OF REVERSE TRANSCRIPTASE 
RESEARCHERS IN THREE SECTORS, AT TIME OF 





School Government Privatea 
Academic/Medical 26 2 1 29 
Government 6 6 
Private 1 2 7 10 
n 27 10 8 45 
a
Includes hospitals. 
Chi/square for academic vs. nonacademic = 
29.88, 1 df, p < .001 
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practice or a scientist's wish to teach part-time instead of preparing con-
tract proposals and researching full-time. 
What the profiles presented thus far hint at are distinctive career 
trajectories for subsets of RT researchers. In general, these researchers 
are professionally young
2 
and somewhat intellectually mobile. Many entered the 
RT domain through postdoctoral apprenticeship at large academic labs
3 
or a 
shifting of research interest while at an NCI lab. The major referents for 
their work circa 1975, as measured by specialization and professional society 
membership, are tumor virology and related microbiological and biochemical 
applications to cancer. Furthermore, their lack of mobility between employ-
ment sectors and the not-inconsiderable status attained in their positions 
by 1975
4 
suggests that even the NCI wunderkinder have forsaken the research 
role
5 
(see Zuckerman and Merton, 1972). Indeed, most seem to be thriving 
in research, having made the adjustments necessary to capitalize upon local 
resources while satisfying administrative demands and, at a microscopic level, 
lending ecological stability to the RT domain. To explore these impressions 
systematically, however, we must relate the emergent career paths to other 
research activities coterminous with the growth of the RT domain. 
Productivity in Reverse Transcriptase and Beyond  
The measurement of research activity within the RT domain represents 
only a portion of the samples' overall productivity. The questions we now 
address center on changes over time in the proportion that is devoted to 
RT, and the correlation of productivity measures with various institutional 
and career-phase attributes. For this analysis, we compare four samples: 
the structural (n = 58), the control (n = 41), those scientists located only 
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at NCI labs from 1970 to 1974 (n = 12), and the members of the visible in-
house network (n = 16).
6 
As seen in Figure Cl the shape of the total article productivity dis-
tributions is almost identical for the four samples, though the level of 
effort in each period varies markedly with the most productive NCI sample 
outstripping the median output of the least productive control sample by 
margins of 4, 2, and 4 to 1, respectively in the three time periods. 
It is in Table C3, however, that the disparities in productivity both 
within the RT domain and relative to total article output are in full dis-
play. The first row of this table suggests that volume of productivity in 
the period preceding the discovery in 1970 is a poor predictor of RT 
productivity for all except the in-house sample. Conversely, the zero-order 
correlations for all except the control sample indicate that during the two 
post-discovery periods, RT publication is significantly correlated with 
total publication output. Nevertheless, if median RT publications are 
divided by median articles for 1970-74 (the interval basically covered by 
the RT effort and our article set), we see that the proportions for three 
of the samples hover around one-third. Only the in-house network devotes 
a majority of its effort to publication within the RT domain. This is not 
surprising, of course, since the productivity criterion for admission into 
this network was at least 10 articles, a threshold, you recall from Chapter 
5, satisfied by only 23 scientists, a scant 2 percent of all the authors 
identified as publishing on reverse transcriptase. Admittedly, therefore, 
it is this criterion, in part, which assures the high correlations for the 
in-house sample. The magnitude of those correlations reinforces the visibil-
ity accrued to these 16 by virtue of their coauthoring together in the domain. 
Their median output of RT articles is more than double that of the eminent 
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MEASURES OF ARTICLE PRODUCTIVITY WITHIN 
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Pearson r between RT 
articles and all 
articles in-- 
1965-69 .153 .252 -.220 .478a 
1970-74 .502b .078 .496a .600a 
1975-76 .415b .185 .703b .524a 
Median RT articles 6.9 4.4 12.5 16.5 
Median RT articles 
all articles 1970-74 
.288 .301 .385 .634 
a
p < .05 
by < .005 
SOURCES: SCI Source Index and RT article file. 
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NCI researchers. What these data thus convey is the greater preoccupation 
with reverse transcriptase research by the in-house and NCI samples. 7 Both 
in an absolute and a relative sense, these researchers devoted a larger 
fraction of their effort to the problems raised by the discovery of the 
enzyme. Indeed, the members of the structural sample concentrated the 
smallest proportion of their output (.288) in 1970-74 on topics within the 
domain, a finding which prompts conjecture about the wider scope of their 
respective research programs and, in terms of their career histories, the 
status they brought with them to the domain rather than that which they 
derived from it. For the members of the structural sample, as well as for 
the control aggregate, research on reverse transcriptase may well have 
represented more of a "passing interest" than a "going concern." We probe 
for the validity of these conjectures in the multivariate analysis which 
immediately follows. 
Explaining Productivity: A Discontinuity of Effort  
As a final attempt to determine the relationship of domain productivity 
to total research effort, we shall perform a series of linear (ordinary 
least-square) regression analyses. Inspection of the zero-order and partial 
correlations among demographic and ecological variables resulted in entering 
degree year into the equations (due to high collinearity, r > .8, with birth 
year), as well as two dummy variables--degree type (Ph.D. or M.D.), and aca-
demic/medical school only employment (1965-76). In the equations predicting 
RT productivity, none of these variables had more than a miniscule effect, 8 
though "academic only" employment does appear in the regressions reported later. 
In Table C4, the number of RT articles published by the structural and 
control samples are regressed separately on three career variables. Signifi-
cantly, membership in the in-house network is a better predictor of within- 
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TABLE C4 
REGRESSION OF RT PRODUCTIVITY ON THREE 
CAREER VARIABLES FOR THE STRUCTURAL 
AND CONTROL SAMPLES 
STRUCTURAL 	 CONTROL  
r 13 r 13 
Total 1965-69 articles .153 .188 .252 .204a 
Membership in in-house network .675 .702b .781 .723 1) 
Location at NCI lab 1970-74 .355 .031 .462 .079 
R2 	 .436 	 .624 
a
F-value p < .05 
bF-value p < .001 
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domain productivity than 1965-69 publications. In fact, the in-house 
variable--though in part a proxy for RT publication--accounts for 90 per-
cent of the variance explained in each of the equations. The low magnitude 
of the zero-order and standardized regression coefficients for the structural 
sample is further evidence of discontinuity in research effort, namely, that 
the level of productivity by these 58 scientists prior to the discovery is 
a poor harbinger of productivity within the RT domain. But does the reverse 
obtain? That is, does RT productivity accurately predict the level of re-
search output in 1975-76? Or does a linear combination of other variables 
provide improved explanation? 
To pursue these questions, the regression analyses summarized in 
Table C5 were performed. Proceeding from the most specific publication in-
formation--RT articles (see Table C5, Regression A) to the most recent 1970-
74 articles (see Regression C)--we observe a three-fold increase in explained 
variance in the structural sample and a five-fold increase for the control. 
These data confirm the conventional wisdom that the best predictor of publi-
cation at t is publication at t-1. But notice the significant 8 for member-
ship in the in-house network for the structural sample under Regression B, and 
the effect of location in an NCI lab for the control sample under B and C.
9 
Work environment in the case of NCI researchers does contribute to their pro-
ductivity level in 1975-76. Academic/medical school employment--perhaps be- 
cause it is less homogeneous in terms of size, resources, and work obligations--
exhibits no explanatory power. 
Once again, then, number of RT articles are far less predictive of sub-
sequent overall productivity than earlier, i.e., prediscovery, publication. 
This finding lends validity to our earlier conjecture about the discontinuity 
in level of research effort. Contributions of the two samples to the un-
folding microcosm of RT seem to be one aspect of ongoing programs that 
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TABLE C5 
REGRESSION OF 1975-76 ARTICLE PRODUCTIVITY 
ON PUBLICATION AND CAREER VARIABLES FOR 
THE STRUCTURAL AND CONTROL SAMPLES 
REGRESSION STRUCTURAL CONTROL 
A. 
RT Articles .415 .433a .185 .146 
In-House Network .225 -.091 .142 -.236a 
NCI Location .222 .194 .423 .486 
Academic Employment .020 .191 c c 
R2 .198 .134 
B. 
1965-69 Articles .694 b .872 .569 .620b 
In-House Network .225 .261a .142 -.220 
NCI Location .222 -.078 .423 .580
b 
Academic Employment -.020 .022 c c 
R2 .542 .532 
C. 
1970-74 Articles .804 
b 
.892 .808 .764b 
In-House Network .255 -.051 .142 .013 
NCI Location .222 .047 .423 .304a 
Academic Employment .020 .111 c c 
R2 	 .651 	 .726 
a F-value p < .05 
b F-value p < .001 
c No information for this sample. 
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center on, if our earlier characterization of AMWS specializations is 
correct, tumor virology and the cellular mechanisms underlying cancer. 
CAREER PROFILES: RAMIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Reverse transcriptase, as a research problem and domain of activity, 
derives coherence from the large laboratories which commit their resources 
and energies to it. This commitment is by no means exclusive; other 
research not dependent on the enzyme appears to be maintained simul-
taneously.
10 
Hence, the connectedness of the domain to other research 
sites, even as seen through the productivity of the central RT scientists, 
labs, and networks, is of negligible assistance in identifying those 
other particular sites. One thing cna be stated with certainty: 
affiliation with an NCI lab promotes overall productivity. Regardless 
of whether this large laboratory effect inflates visibility in the bio- 
medical literature, 11 as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, it undoubtedly 
furnishes the wherewithal and institutional support of readily-available 
collaborators to seize upon and extend the discoveries made in smaller, 
modestly-endowed and -manned labs. This seems to be the legacy of Big 
Biology and perhaps the clearest benefit of mission-oriented research. As 
several of our interview subjects asserted, "The discovery of reverse 
transcriptase could not have been made in a large NCI lab because you just 
don't have time to think imaginatively." 
If discovery is in the realm of basic unfettered science, then, in 
contrast, intramural NCI researchers are best equipped and poised to strike 
deeper at the targets hit by extramural researchers. We hasten to add, 
however, that most NCI scientists with whom we spoke confessed that their 
initial reaction to hearing of the discovery of reverse transcriptase was 
not surprise or shock, but, "So what? Big deal:" Most claimed to be 
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vaguely aware of the provirus hypothesis at the time, but utterly uncon-
cerned with the repercussions that its confirmation would have. 
One conclusion to be drawn from our findings, then, is that a 
"eureka model" of biomedical specialization still very much engenders the 
attraction of researchers to new problems.12 Neither degree type nor pro-
fessional youth predict where biologists will migrate in search of new 
problems or new angles on old problems. The traces of a problem domain 
that we detect in a concentration of literature must be extracted from 
the larger intellectual nexus in which it is enmeshed. 13 Ironically, 
what we extract is so intimately connected to so much that, upon separate 
analysis, the domain now isolated harbors few clues as to where to look 
next. For just as researchers become acclimated to a particular work en-
vironment, they are fickle in applying their energies to an assortment of 
problems; they preserve the setting for their research, while re-ordering 
their intellectual priorities. Thus, when we examine a problem domain, we 
see a patchwork of fragmented individual, institutional, and perhaps even 
sectoral (e.g., government) research programs, while the "missing" frag-
ments of these programs attach to other literatures. 
Likewise, a domain captures a cross-section of the biomedical com-
munity--in terms of career trajectory, disciplinary background, scientific 
role incumbency--that has converged sufficiently long on a problem to 
attract new resources, attention in the literature, funding from agencies, 
and manpower from those capable of shifting gears on sustaining multiple 
interests. This represents a fluidity of careers for some, a status 
change for others, a sudden wave of productivity, visibility, and prestige 
for many. Such a period effect is bound to be lost at the formal, 
official, or on-the-record level. For this reason, we sought to collect--
through interviewing--informal, subjective, and private perceptions. 
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To wit, 
I've heard of people who were disappointed because they didn't 
get the Nobel prize. When they . . . started working on RT 
problems after the discovery, they then thought that they should 
somehow be prized. I just thought that was silly. 
Any small investigator would be crazy to start working on RT 
[after the discovery] . . . knowing that he was going to have to 
compete with these huge laboratories [e.g., Spiegelman's, Gallo's, 
Todaro's]. . . . 
. . . the guys who got the Nobel prize for this thing are the ones 
who have issued by executive fear . . . that RNA tumor viruses have 
nothing to do with human cancer. Right? This has been taken very 
seriously by the guys who dole out the money. And so young people 
who just don't have the security required to stick with their con-
victions are just not applying for money [to do] research on a human 
disease. . . . It makes life difficult in the sense that I don't get 
any intellectual and experimental support in the community. . . . 
[T]hat means everything has to be done in one place . . . and is 
slowed down enormously. So instead of getting help and cross-
fertilization in terms of ideas and data coming out of the labora-
tories, that's just dried up. 
I guess I consciously decided after the discovery of RT that I 
wanted to take that as an opportunity to get deeply involved in 
studying RNA tumor viruses and the whole problem of cancer. And 
being a lab scientist, I thought it most appropriate to let the ex-
periments take me. . . . 
CONCLUSION 
A demographic profile of RT researchers is a collective biography of a 
set of scientists constrained by many realities: a discovery, diverse dis-
ciplinary frameworks and training experiences, and jobs demanding the meshing 
of intellectual impulse with deadlines, personalities, and often mundane obli-
gations.
14 This set of biologists--those we interviewed and those we merely 
glimpsed at a distance--are remarkably accomplished, insightful, and engaged 
in what we suspect are modally productive careers. Their coming together 
for a short time in a problem domain is just one in a succession of 
such confluences they will experience and help to foment. Yet we must be 
resigned to understanding mere segments of their intersecting professional 
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lives spent in particular domains, or abandon the confluence approach 
altogether and embrace a neater cohort design wherein the individual 
sui generis, and not the specialty or problem domain, commands the focus 
of analysis. 
Because we have opted for a confluence approach, the individual 
is relegated to a subordinate role as an agent of change and symbol of 
success in the historiography of a domain. By comparing two and sometimes 
three and four small aggregates of researchers whose career paths crossed 
within the RT domain, we have sampled a population which, in a host of 
ways, impinged upon, and became identified with, the specialization of 
reverse transcriptase. We know now, too, that it is indispensable to that 
historiography to track ideas through persons and organizations; idealized 
scientific objects alone--theories, methods, and apparatus--will not do. 
Such objects are manipulated and debated, socially transformed into 
structures that social analysts can then dissect and relate in time and 
space to a wider spectrum of esoteric artifacts and their specially-trained 
producers. 
This is a realistic approach to science (see Epilogue) in which 
the force of knowledge--within a domain and beyond--begets a demography and 
ecology of science which affects both the state of knowledge in biomedicine 
and the more idiosyncratic processes of scientific careers. Thus, our 
methodological injunction persists: large-sample unobtrusive sociological 
analysis of career patterns and small-sample intellectual and social history 
cannot stand alone in explaining migrations to and from problem domains. 
Motivations, intentions, and responses to organizational imperatives cannot 
be inferred from the operation of period effects on aggregates of scientific 
workers. 
The subjectivity of career decisions must be probed with the subjects 
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themselves 15 (see Goodfield, 1977), ideally but realistically in the con-
text of (a) their natural work environment, and (b) the research program 
which dictates their manipulations of cognitive objects (see Whitley, 
1977). This recourse to the living is why the problem domain is espec-
ially accessible; nonetheless, a domain is easy to reify and difficult 
to interpret apart from the problem which generated it. That is, reverse 
transcriptase is not the sole province of virology or molecular biology, 
because the problem is really "cancer" or "cellular transformation"— 
problems which require multiple disciplinary perspectives and occupy 
correspondingly heterogeneous cadres of researchers. To divorce the 
problem from its attendant work force is to separate cognitive from social 
structure. And to separate these structures is to explain neither: a worker-





The most celebrated exception to this dictum would be Jeffrey Schlom's exper-
ience. A Rutgers Ph.D., Schlom did predoctoral research at NCI, was invited 
by then-NCI director Rauscher (himself a Rutgers Ph.D. in virology) and John 
Maloney to join Spiegelman when he moved from Illinois to Columbia (in search 
of a medical school and clinical climate). Spiegelman invited Schlom and a 
productive four-year collaboration ensued, whereupon Rauscher "called" Schlom 
back to NCI to chair the Breast Cancer Virus Segment of the Tumor Virus Detec-
tion Section in the Laboratory of Viral Carcinogenesis. Like Aaronson, Gallo, 
Scolnick, Todaro, and Parks (who has since left NCI to practice pediatrics), 
Schlom "grew up" in NCI. All are young men in their mid- to late-30s who 
now hold key administrative positions while remaining "at the bench." 
2
The only "elder statesmen" of the domain are Spiegelman and Huebner, both in 
their 60s, and Green, who is only 52. 
3
This is consistent with Crane's (1972) findings on the attraction of young 
scientists to visible senior researchers in mathematics and sociology spe-
cialties, but underscores the import of studying the postdoctoral mentor-
student relationship (see Zuckerman, 1977, and Mullins, 1973, for evidence 
on the predoctoral version of this relationship). 
4
Among the mail respondents, 14 report (median) advisory service on two edi-
torial boards of major journals such as Journal of Virology, Cancer Research, 
Cell, and Journal of Molecular Biology. In all, the honorific-functional role 
of gatekeeper (Crane, 1967) was being executed for 21 different journals. 
5
As one of the wunderkinder with whom we spoke put it: 
In an Institute like NIH and NCI, to get really top-flight scientists 
to become administrators at these high levels, you really have to 
be fairly dedicated and interested in these broad, broad things, 
because in most universities you can make a lot more money as you 
move up towards the deans and, you know, presidents; and in insti- 
tutes like Sloan-Kettering or McArdle or some of these other places, 
as you move up, that doesn't mean you move out of your lab relation-
ships. In a government situation, beyond the level that I'm at now, 
which is lab chief, if you move higher than that, you're involved in 
sort of distributing money to the world. You really can't, I don't 
think, compete at that point. You have to be above the battle, so 
it isn't that easy to fill these higher positions. 
6
Note that whereas the first two samples are mutually exclusive, the latter two 
are subsets which cut across the combined membership (n = 99) of the former. 
Specifically, one half of the in-house network membership were NCI employees 
from 1970-74. 
7
Interestingly, if only first-authored articles are considered (a measure 
Zuckerman, 1968, has shown to indicate junior status, i.e., its frequency wanes 
with increased professional age), three-fourths of the NCI sample's median out-
put in the 1965-69 period qualifies, a proportion almost twice that of the 
structural sample. In the post-discovery period, these proportions decline 
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to a similar level of one-third, but the median number of the first-authored 
articles by NCI researchers is 11.8 as compared with 10.5 for the in-house 
sample and 8.5 for the structural sample. In short, youth and the visibility 
achieved via first authorship in collaborative publication need not go hand-
in-hand. 
8
In addition, type of degree is inconsequential for predicting productivity. 
Apparently, a research M.D. and a Ph.D. are comparable, though the orientation 
and focus of their respective researches (even within a problem domain) may 
differ. Our suggestion that a medical-clinical model may be guiding the work 
of M.D.s more than basic Ph.D. scientists was pooh-poohed unanimously by our 
interviewees. Distinguishing orientations is not that clean or simple. 
9
A similar effect was revealed in the question using 1970-74 articles as the 
primary independent variable for predicting 1975-76 productivity of the in-
house sample (R 2 = .763). 
10
See Hagstrom (1970) for a discussion of simultaneous work and publication 
in different but related research areas. Such simultaneity seems to contrast 
with the migratory pattern manifested by other scientists (see Edge and Mulkay, 
1976: Chapter 10). 
11
Belatedly, we report that the confounding of individuals by laboratory cita-
tion profiles militated against our use of citations as a variable in the 
previous regression analyses. 
12
A quote from one of our subjects ably summarizes the attraction phenomenon: 
You know, at some point in your life, you become fairly wedded to 
a given area. You've done well, you know it. But the young guy, 
the guy coming out of school, you know, if there is money, he'd be 
a food not to look at it. If you just haven't become too focused 
yet. I think that does attract. 
13
As one of our interviewees put it: 
All you have to do is read the Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences and find several good areas which are being minimally 
explored, which you can do experiments on, and which will be con-
tributory. 
And yet another claimed: 
You ask anybody in what section of PNAS their paper was published, 
and they probably will not be able to tell you--whether it was 
microbiology or biochemistry or genetics. I mean, they don't know. 
14For example, one of our subjects, a veteran academic researcher, commented 
on NCI employment: 
If you are at NIH, first of all, or NCI, which is the same thing, 
you have some security in that you have a laboratory and a stable 
source of money. However, you have a problem that you can't expand 
your laboratory and bring more people in, so you have to go and 
get some other building someplace run by somebody else under a 
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contract, so you're going to have to do all the administration. 
In addition, at NCI you get paid less, so you have to be somewhat 
dedicated, and furthermore you're given tasks. The tasks are that 
if you have these contracts, you have to go out, and as part of 
your obligation, write reports about these contracts, defend those 
contracts, evaluate them, present them to other study sections, 
so there is a lot of scientific administrative work that 
goes along with it. So it's sort of a mixed blessing being at 
NCI. 
The minority viewpoint is that of prominent lab chief: 
I came from an academic setting, and if I ever left NCI, I would 
go back to an academic setting. I consider myself a reasonably 
good scientist in standing with the academic community, but I 
am told that actually their perception--the academicians' per-
ception--of the way government does business in fact is not the 
way that the government does business. 
This relates to another lament we frequently heard concerning the inflexibility 
of Civil Service: the security it affords the lab workers can haunt the lab 
chief because civil servants can't be fired; only minor realignment of such 
personnel is allowed. As one NCI chief assured us, 
If one wanted to get rid of someone who was obviously incompe-
tent, one would have to give up science for a year and make 
it a full-time desire. 
15
A flurry of biographical and autobiographical accounts has recently appeared 
which trace the evolution of personal research programs against the backdrop 
of intellectual and social histories of disciplines. These memoirs, taken 
together, offer new opportunities for weighing the forces which shaped sci-
entific careers and ostensibly alter the face of those disciplines as well 
(see Bernstein, 1977; Kuhn, 1977; Merton, 1977; Toulmin, 1977). 
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